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ABSTRACT
The Principles and Rhetoric of Autarky:
Debate and Decision-making in Early Colonial Kenya
Ian Ferguson
This study seeks to understand the decision-making process of the colonial government
of the East Africa Protectorate by articulating the principles of autarky: financial independence,
development, and effective occupation. The principles of autarky, which are both goal and
process for the colonial government, strove to bring that government to a state of selfsufficiency, or autarky. These principles created their own rhetoric within official
correspondence which dominated the decision-making process. By looking at three different
periods, Foreign Office control, the transition to Colonial Office responsibility, and the Soldier
Settlement Scheme of 1919, the importance of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in debate
and decision-making is made clear.
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Ferguson 1
Chapter 1
Introduction: Establishing the Model
The history of the East Africa Protectorate (EAP) was filled with critical decisions. It
was these decisions that both shaped the controversial history of Kenya and haunted colonial
administrators until independence in 1963. In the latter case, Colonial Office (CO) officials were
quickly aware of the dangers inherent in poor decision-making; time and again they felt the
pressure of precedent in the territory and feared aggravating existing issues. All the same, they
persisted in making decisions that were both controversial and problematic, in some cases doing
so even before they were made and debate between officials was ongoing! Whether it was the
policy of settling Europeans in the White Highlands, or restricting Indian and African veterans of
the First World War from the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919, it is difficult to understand the
rationale behind such decisions. To put it simply, why did CO officials reach the decisions that
they did?
The Principles and Rhetoric of Autarky
To answer this question, I propose a new model through which we can understand
decision-making in early colonial Kenya: the principles and rhetoric of autarky. Put simply, the
rhetoric of autarky is the self-sustaining mode of conversation among individuals centered on the
concept of autarky. Autarky is the conceptual sum of three interrelated constituent ideas:
effective occupation, development, and financial independence.1 These ideas, the principles of
autarky, must in turn be explained.
Effective occupation is the principle of effective use of occupied land. The basic concept
is that land should be in the hands of those who can make the most use of it. This idea can be

1

A full explanation of why “autarky” was chosen as the name for this concept is given later.
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found in classical philosophy and earlier British imperial history,2 but in the East African
context, effective occupation took different forms. For example, it took the form of European
settlers, mostly aristocrats, with large amounts of private capital to invest in the land they would
be granted. It was hoped that these occupants would effectively develop and farm the land on an
estate model as yeomen farmers for the production of marketable commodities. In practice, this
principle took many different forms of debate in the selection of potential settlers: land
speculation, minimum capital requirements, applicant health, and complex lottery strategies to
name only a few.3 The principle of effective occupation is a critical component of autarky and is
directly linked to development and financial independence.
Development, which has a complex conceptual history, needs to be defined in more detail
than either effective occupation or financial independence. As Joseph Hodge and Gerald Hödl
note, the definition of development often changes according to the scholar using the term and the
context of its use. For example, they use the distinctions of development as process or product,
as raising productivity or living standards, or as immanent or planned course of action.4 All of
these distinctions of development are valid, and indeed they are valid as a principle of autarky
insofar as they relate to and support the other principles of autarky.5 However, using these
distinctions, the development component of autarky commonly found in this study is the planned
product, such as agricultural and infrastructural improvements, aimed at raising productivity.
This leads to another critical distinction: the one between state and private development. While

David Armitage The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
49-51. The history of the principles of autarky, a short glimpse of which Armitage notes in this citation, will be
given shortly.
3 These examples are merely illustrative of the principle of effective occupation and not exhaustive.
4 Joseph M. Hodge and Gerald Hödl, introduction to Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in TwentiethCentury Colonialism, eds. Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hödl and Martina Kopf (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2014), 3-4.
5 In other words, if a definition of development used in a specific context promotes effective occupation and
financial independence then it is valid as a principle of autarky.
2
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state development had its place, particularly after 1940 in Kenya, this study looks more closely at
the colonial government’s attempts to mobilize private capital for development purposes.6
This leads to the third principle of autarky, financial independence. Financial
independence is understood in this study in two senses: direct independence of action from the
oversight of another government agency, namely the British Treasury; and the ability to enact
policies independent of financial restriction.7 The former sense is especially prominent in the
early administration of the EAP. The grants-in-aid awarded to the protectorate to pay for its
administration required the CO to pass along decisions as to using that money to the Treasury for
final approval. Such a situation resulted in government-by-Treasury where even relative
minutiae, like the appointment of minor civil servants in the colony, needed Treasury approval.8
Sir Charles Jeffries, a long-serving senior CO official, superbly described the principle of
financial independence as it related to the relationship between CO and Treasury:
The Colonies were expected to pay their own way, and to cut their coat according to their cloth.
If they were prosperous, they were free to go ahead with whatever economic and social
developments the local authorities wished. Most of them, however, were far from prosperous,
and could afford little from their own resources beyond the bare minimum needed to preserve
law and order and to provide for the administration of justice and the collection of revenue. . . .
Some could not even afford this minimum; and in these cases the United Kingdom Exchequer
was prepared to make grants in aid, though this was always considered as a temporary expedient,
and the finances of any territory ‘on the dole’ were subject to strict control by the Treasury.9
However, even after the end of this government-by-Treasury in 1913, the colonial government
and the CO were still restricted by financial limitations. Large-scale infrastructure projects
aimed at increasing colonial revenue still needed loan approval from the Treasury. To govern

These qualifications are useful distinctions rather than polarities or dichotomies that are mutually exclusive. The
documents show that officials thought of state and private development as complimentary to each other.
7 “Financial independence” is used rather than “financial self-sufficiency” to put the emphasis on the independence
of action. There are possible situations where a colonial government could have the independence of financial
action without achieving financial self-sufficiency.
8 The CO’s desire to hire more surveyors and an assistant Crown Advocate in the second chapter is an example of
this.
9 Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Office (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 106.
6
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the colony as they saw fit, CO officials needed to enact policies that would lead to financial
independence.
Autarky, the sum of these three principles, was the unspoken paradigm around which
official debate centered. The desire for financial independence could be achieved, it was
believed, through the export of marketable commodities by effective European settlers who
could also help to develop the land with their private capital. Although this is a radically
simplified example of the model, it is representative of the interconnected nature of the
principles of autarky. All aspects of the official correspondence (dispatch letters, enclosures,
minutes, and technical reports of every stripe) were structured with reference to the model.
A Concise Genesis of Autarky
The concept of autarky as a governing principle has a long history. Indeed, the use of
“autarky” stems from the classical Greek term autarkeia, which Plato defined as “selfsufficiency: perfect possession of good things; the state in respect of which those who have it are
masters of themselves.”10 Plato’s definition, however, was focused on the moral importance of
autarky rather than the political. This moral focus is exemplified in two cases. First, explicitly
in the Lysis, where Plato, through the character Socrates, argued in the form of a question that “a
good person, insofar as he is good, [is] sufficient to himself.”11 Second, in the beginning of the
Republic, the former definition of a good person was given a specific example. The character
Cephalus, an elderly and wealthy man, explained how his financial independence12 allowed him
to lead a good life: “I would say the possession of wealth is most valuable, not for every man,
but for a good and orderly one. Not cheating someone even unintentionally, not lying to him, not

Plato, Definitions, ed. John Cooper, trans. D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997),
412b.
11 Plato, Lysis, ed. John Cooper, trans. Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 215a.
12 This example also gives a clear moral desire to the principles of autarky. A financially independent colonial
government might be less likely to commit evils against its subject population for the same reasons as Cephalus
gave.
10
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owing a sacrifice to some god or money to a person, and as a result departing from that place in
fear – the possession of wealth makes no small contribution to this. It has many other uses, too,
but putting one thing against the other, Socrates, I would say that for a man with any sense, that
is how wealth is most useful.”13
With reference to the political aspect of Plato’s thought, material autarky was still
secondary to the moral imperative. In Book V of his Laws, Plato gave an early example of the
autarkic principles of effective occupation and development when pronouncing the best way to
distribute land to the citizens of a city. He wrote that the Legislator “must allocate to each
division of citizens a god or spirit or perhaps a hero, and when he divides up the territory he must
give these priority by setting aside plots of land for them, endowed with all the appropriate
resources. Thus when the different divisions gather together at fixed times they will have an
opportunity of satisfying their various needs, and the citizens will recognize and greet each other
at the sacrifices in mutual friendship – and there will be no greater benefit for a state than that the
citizens should be well-known one to another.”14
Where Plato saw autarky as a means to a moral end, Aristotle saw autarky as the end
itself, but in two different senses: the individual and the political sense. Like Plato, Aristotle’s
autarky for the individual was a moral object, but contrary to Plato, it was the absolute end for
the individual.15 Since happiness, eudaimonia, is complete without qualification, or pursued for
its own sake rather than for something else, and self-sufficiency (autarkeia) lacks nothing, they

13
14

e.

Plato, Republic, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 331a-b.
Plato, Laws, ed. John Cooper, trans. Trevor Saunders (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 5. 738d-

It can, and should, be argued that the Platonic ideal of the self-sufficient good person was also an end, the critical
difference between the two was that Plato saw that end as impossible to achieve, while Aristotle saw the end as
achievable. Therefore, Plato’s end was a goal for an indefinite process and Aristotle’s end was a true achievable
end.
15
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were the end of the individual.16 Just as self-sufficiency was the mark of Aristotle’s conception
of happiness, in the political sense self-sufficiency was the mark of the city, or polis.17 To
achieve autarky, a city must manage its population, territory, and social structure. A city’s
population cannot be too small or too large; if it is too small it will not be able to provide for its
own needs and if it is too large it will be ungovernable.18 The territory should be one that
“ensures the maximum of self-sufficiency.”19 The social structure of the city should be such that
it has all of those groups that can provide for the city’s needs: “a body of farmers to produce the
necessary food; craftsmen; a military force; a propertied class; priests; and those who decide
necessary issues and determine what is the public interest.”20
These Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of autarky found their way into British imperial
thought in the 16th century through the works of Richard Hakluyt. This was accomplished
principally through two works: “Discourse of Western Planting” and “Analysis, seu resolutio
perpetua in octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis.” The “Analysis,” a critical Latin examination of
Aristotle’s Politics, gave the English government a guide for the nature of the best state, which
was self-sufficient as Aristotle argued, and how to achieve it. Hakluyt’s “Discourse” was the
call for colonies in North America to satisfy the economic needs of England in the form of
outlets for overpopulation and a market for English products, as well as a way to secure
commodities not grown in England. Like Aristotle and Plato, Hakluyt’s ultimate goal was
happiness, or eudaimonia, which he hoped to achieve through the spread of Christian, Protestant
religion.21
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999),
1.7.1097a36-1097b22. It is interesting that the principles of autarky are also pursued for their own sake, as is argued
in the Conclusion.
17 Aristotle, Politics, ed. R. F. Stalley, trans. Ernest Baker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1.2.1252b271253a1.
18 Ibid., 7.4.1326a25-1326b6.
19 Ibid., 7.5.1326b27-1326b30.
20 Ibid., 7.8.1328b2-1328b23.
21 Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, 70-76.
16
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Why “Autarky”
While Hakluyt’s concepts of autarky were not wholly original, his application and pursuit
of those concepts with English colonialism was. Likewise, this study takes preexisting ideas, the
underlying definitions of the principles of autarky, and crafts them into an original paradigm.
This paradigm uses the term “autarky” rather than simple “self-sufficiency” for two reasons.
First, to link the paradigm of the principles and rhetoric of autarky to the intellectual genesis of
the concept of autarky. And second, to highlight the emphasis placed on the goal of selfsufficiency with specific reference to good governance. Plato, Aristotle, and Hakluyt all argued
the pursuit of autarky, not only as an end in itself, but as a necessary compliment to that which
was best for the city and its citizens; whether that was Plato’s “Good” or Aristotle and Hakluyt’s
eudaimonia. Autarky, therefore, is used to denote both that link to its history and the moral, selffulfilling component to self-sufficiency.
Methodology and Chapter Structure
The principles and rhetoric of autarky can only be supported by a close reading of official
communication related to the administration of the EAP in a variety of situations. To that end,
each of the next three chapters employs a different methodological approach to show that the
model is not limited in any way to either period or approach.
The second chapter follows the earliest British administration of the EAP by the Imperial
British East Africa Company (IBEAC) and the Foreign Office (FO). By examining different
episodes from this period (1885-1905), like the transfer from the IBEAC to the FO or the
Parliamentary debate over funding of the Uganda Railway, the precedent of the principles and
rhetoric of autarky in decision-making is established. This chapter uses a combination of
secondary and primary sources to give a broad account of the principles and rhetoric of autarky
in a variety of situations over time.
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Chapter three, “The ‘Prime Mover’ of Policy,” argues that the principles of autarky were
the “prime mover” of policy rather than the traditional answers the historiography gives: the
personalities of individual officials, institutional practices, and precedent. The chapter does this
by examining how some orthodox historical accounts perceive the continuity or discontinuity in
policy in the transition from FO responsibility of the EAP to CO responsibility in 1905. To
effectively argue that the principles of autarky were the prime mover of policy, this chapter uses
the official 533 series of CO correspondence to closely examine three different policy
discussions immediately after the transfer of responsibility to the CO in 1905. In contrast to the
first chapter, which gives a more general approach to the principles of autarky, this chapter gives
a highly focused account in a limited time period.
In chapter four, “The Language of Policy: The East African Soldier Settlement Scheme
of 1919,” the soldier settlement scheme is followed from its proposal in 1916 to its
implementation in 1919. The chapter shows how the principles and rhetoric of autarky form the
“language of policy” whereby the official debate over the existence and execution of the scheme
is conducted. Methodologically, it is both similar and dissimilar to the previous chapter; similar
in its close examination of the 533 series of CO correspondence, and dissimilar in that it follows
a single policy debate from proposal to implementation. The latter point is critical in that it
shows the omnipresence of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in a policy discussion beyond
any one time or aspect of a discussion, as could be argued of the examples given in the first or
second chapters.
A final methodological point remains; the narratives presented are written in such a way
as to try to show the omnipresence of the principles and rhetoric of autarky without substantively
changing the sources that inform those narratives. This style intentionally leaves many
conclusions intentionally undrawn. Those conclusions that are explicitly stated are illustrative of

Ferguson 9
the model. There are two reasons why every possible conclusion is not drawn. First, if every
aspect of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in these narratives is explicitly stated, that would
result in a repetition, and more, of the narratives presented. Such an exhaustive approach loses
the momentum of the narratives and the interest of the reader while not providing reciprocal
support for the paradigm. Second, it allows the reader to actively engage in the narrative
arguments and draw their own connections to the paradigm. Doing so, it is hoped, leads the
reader to a stronger understanding of the principles and rhetoric of autarky.
Historiographical Comparisons
With the paradigm established, it is necessary to show how it is different from a few
select other models of administrative decision-making in Kenyan history. The historiographical
groundwork for examining the early history of colonial Kenya was laid in the 1960s with the
foundational works of George Bennett, G. H. Mungeam, and M.P.K Sorrenson.22 Mungeam and
Sorrenson made extensive use of FO and CO sources to establish their narratives, similar to this
approach, but the focus of their works were not to investigate why decisions were made, or
agreed to by these departments. Rather, Mungeam was concerned with how the establishment
and expansion of British administration impacted local Africans, with only limited arguments for
decision-making that focused on the confusion within the FO and CO as well as precedent.
Sorrenson, in examining how European settlers came to settle in Kenya, used aspects of the
principles of autarky to explain the beginning of that settlement under commissioner Sir Charles
Eliot, but then places the expansion and focus of this program on the political activism of the
settlers.

George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History: The Colonial Period (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); G. H.
Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of
European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968).
22

Ferguson 10
The two works that come closest to this study’s approach are Stephen Constantine’s The
Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940 and Robert Maxon’s Struggle for
Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923.23 Like this study,
Constantine focused on the decision-making in the CO related to development and how those
decisions came to be. However, he placed the reasons for those decisions on the surface issues
of precedent, institutional practice, and the personalities of individual officials.24 Maxon’s book
is also similar in its close examination of the CO correspondence, but it is different from this
study in its conclusions. While Maxon argued that during the First World War and under the
settler-friendly governorships of Sir Henry Conway Belfield (1912-1917) and Sir Edward
Northey (1919-1922) the CO lost its policy initiative, this study deviates from this analysis by
arguing that the CO willingly yielded policy initiative to settler-influenced governors because the
policy they espoused was in relative alignment with the principles of autarky.25
However, other paradigms of colonial decision-making and state formation, like those of
Richard Wolff and Bruce Berman, need to be considered and compared to the autarkic model. In
The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930, Wolff applied the dependency
paradigm of a capitalist metropole that sought to accumulate surplus from the colonial
periphery.26 Berman took this paradigm further in Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The
Dialectic of Domination.27 He paired Marxist theory with a rich narrative of the colonial state to

Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940 (London: Frank Cass,
1984); Robert Maxon, Struggle for Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923 (London:
Associated University Presses, 1993).
24 Chapter three answers this criticism of Constantine’s book, but does not explicitly refer to it. This is because the
narrative focus of that chapter is on the transfer of responsibility from FO to CO, which Constantine does not
address.
25 Chapter four addresses this point through the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919 and the governorships of
Belfield and Northey.
26 Richard Wolff, The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1974).
27 Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (Athens: Ohio University
Press, 1990).
23

Ferguson 11
understand the dynamic process of control and exploitation. The autarkic model deviates from
these analyses methodologically. Rather than using existing paradigms to explain decisionmaking, this study uses the primary evidence to create a paradigm that explains decision-making.
With the model introduced, methods explained, and historiographical comparisons drawn, it is
necessary to turn to the FO administration of the EAP.
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Chapter 2
“Into an Entirely New and Different Country:” The Principles of Autarky and Foreign
Office Administration
The short, ten-year tenure of FO administration of the EAP was a critical juncture in
Kenyan history, where the precedents that shaped and supported subsequent policies were
decided by administrators and politicians that were new to colonial administration. This relative
inexperience with both colonial administration and of the land to be administered created a
unique historical moment; a moment where administrative policy was created “from the ground
up” and with little to no specific precedents for decision-making. What, then, were the
motivating factors behind the choices which would shape the destiny of the territory?
This chapter will show that the principles of autarky can be seen to govern the decisionmaking process during the FO administration of the EAP through a clearly defined rhetoric based
on those principles: the rhetoric of autarky. The rhetoric of autarky dominated the debates
surrounding critical decisions that established what would be long-held precedents within the
territory. Even those individuals that disagreed with the direction of policy, couched their
arguments with reference to the principles of autarky. To show the ever-presence of the rhetoric
of autarky in critical moments, this chapter will examine the established historical narrative of
FO administration through that lens. By reexamining the transfer of administration to the FO
from a private chartered company, the debate over continued funding of the Uganda Railway,
and the choice of settlement policy, the ubiquity of the rhetoric of autarky and the precedents it
set become apparent.
The Failure of IBEAC Administration
Before the proclamation of the EAP in 1895, the territory of much of modern Uganda and
Kenya were administered by a British chartered company, IBEAC. The IBEAC was a
compromise among British policymakers who wanted to simultaneously avoid the trappings of
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new colonial possessions in East Africa and to prevent other European powers, particularly
Germany, France, and Italy, from expanding into the area. This interest in the region stemmed
from the strategic concern over the security of the Nile River. It was theorized that if a rival
power were to control any part of the river, they could endanger the British position in Egypt by
damming or diverting it and thus creating an economic or ecological crisis. If the British hold
over Egypt was compromised, then the Suez Canal, the vital lifeline to India, would also be
compromised. Although the idea of expanding British influence in the region was defended with
religious and economic rhetoric, the primary motivation was strategic.1
The creation of the IBEAC gave the FO the compromise that it sought: control over the
headwaters of the Nile that the Nile Valley Imperative demanded and turn the responsibility of
administration over to a private company. The Company was created on 18 April 1888 with an
initial capital of £250,000 and the founding goals of the acquisition of territory from native
chiefs in the British sphere of influence and elsewhere by treaty, purchase or otherwise, and the
exercise of all rights pertaining to sovereignty over acquired districts, such as the enforcement of
laws and the levying of taxes.2 This strong mandate for control quickly came into conflict with
the physical and economic realities of the territory. The Company’s capitalization and the
territory’s economic prospects proved unequal to the costs of its effective administration.

Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of
Imperialism (London: Macmillan and Co, 1961), 283-306. This is a highly contentious point in the historiography.
While Robinson and Gallagher’s thesis has been used by East African historians like G. H. Mungeam, British Rule
in Kenya, 6-8; and M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement, 9-12; it has a wide array of opponents with
competing theses. Richard Wolff, The Economics of Colonialism, 3-5; G.N. Uzoigwe, “The Victorians and East
Africa, 1882-1900: The Robinson-Gallagher Thesis Revisited,” Transafrican Journal of History 5, no. 2 (1976): 3265; John Darwin, “Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion,” The English Historical
Review 112, no. 447 (Jun., 1997): 614-642; and most recently Jonas Fossli Gjerso, “The Scramble for East Africa:
British Motives Reconsidered, 1884-95,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no. 5 (2015):
831-860; are all examples of different approaches to British territorial acquisition in East Africa. However, whether
the British came for commercial, humanitarian, strategic, diplomatic, or some combination of these reasons to the
area is ultimately immaterial to this study as the effect is the same. These were all imperial reasons for occupation
and led to the financial strain and collapse of the IBEAC.
2 Founders Agreement, April 18, 1888 in P.L. McDermott, British East Africa or IBEA: A History of the Formation
and Work of the Imperial British East Africa Company (London: Chapman and Hall, 1893), 276-281, Appendix 2.
1
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Minerals, the godsend of South Africa, were not present in East Africa. Commodity production
and trade were little better. Ivory was one of the only marketable goods in the area, and its trade
was already controlled by the coastal Swahili and Indian traders. Import and export trade in the
interior between the kingdom of Buganda and the coast was unprofitable for the Company. The
pastoral and subsistence modes of production practiced by Africans produced little that was
worth exporting and the Africans disinterest in British manufactured goods forestalled their
importation. The greatest prospect for profit came from Buganda, which the British perceived as
having a sophisticated societal structure. Even though the possibilities for profitable trade
between Buganda and the IBEAC were stymied by the Kingdom’s relative self-sufficiency, the
real challenge was transportation.3
Transportation costs were the overwhelming culprit in the eventual demise of the IBEAC.
All transportation of goods and communications between IBEAC outposts and administrative
centers had to be conducted by caravan and porterage, which was prohibitively expensive. For
example, it cost the IBEAC £250 to transport one ton of goods the 700 miles from their post in
Uganda to the coast.4 While this kind of expenditure was obviously unsustainable for a private
company that did not have the necessary revenue, the IBEAC’s only real response, the
construction of a railway, was also untenable. The construction would be a massive investment
of capital that the Company did not have. Therefore, IBEAC directors asked the British
government to guarantee the interest on the capital required to build a railway from Mombasa on
the coast to the eastern shore of Lake Victoria.5 Sir William Mackinnon, the founder and
president of the IBEAC, attempted to persuade Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (SoSFA), of the efficacy of the guarantee by appealing to the FO reasons for instituting

G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 12, 15; John Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895: A Study in
the ‘New Imperialism’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 163-165, 199-202.
4 W. McGregor Ross, Kenya from Within: A Short Political History (London: Routledge, 1927), 35.
5 Ibid., 36; Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 200-223.
3
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the Company. Mackinnon argued that the Company gave the FO the control of the headwaters
of the Nile and also saved the British Treasury the cost of direct administration. Although Lord
Salisbury was convinced, the Treasury rejected the proposal and instead proposed that the
government would pay for a portion of the costs, not more than £20,000, of a preliminary survey
for the railroad. The House of Commons, in turn, rejected the more limited proposal. This
outright rejection of the Company’s railroad proposal, combined with the annual cost of £40,000
for the upkeep of administration in Uganda, led the IBEAC to propose withdrawing from that
territory on 16 July 1891.6
The IBEAC’s determination to withdraw from Uganda caused a scandal in Great Britain.
The Company, it was argued, was the representative of Great Britain in Uganda. If the Company
were to withdraw, it would be a dramatic loss of international prestige and a potential reversal of
the British anti-slavery and missionary activities there. The fear provoked by the latter point
prompted the Church Missionary Society (CMS) to donate £16,000 to the IBEAC in order to
delay their proposed withdrawal. Although this was a sizeable private grant, it was not enough
to keep the IBEAC from collapsing under the financial strain of its responsibilities. In fact, the
strain was so severe that Mackinnon rejected a proposal in November 1892 by the FO to
continue IBEAC administration with government assistance. On 18 June 1893 the Uganda
Protectorate was declared and the IBEAC officially withdrew. A little over two years later, with
their financial position continuing to decline, the IBEAC charter was bought out for £250,000.7
The period of IBEAC administration in East Africa make the importance of the principles
of autarky abundantly clear. Financial independence was necessary for the survival of the
IBEAC and the accomplishment of its goals. Its dependence on insufficient outside sources of
funding forced it to take actions it did not want to, like the evacuation of Uganda and officials
6
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forcing local peoples to provide food and porters,8 and ultimately led to its demise. One of the
only ways for the Company to achieve financial independence was to overcome the
transportation costs that plagued it through the development of a railroad. Development was
inseparable from financial independence for the IBEAC. With limited funding provided by
private institutions, like the CMS, and the government, the financial dependence of the Company
made the construction of the railroad an impossibility.
The other way to achieve financial independence and development was through effective
occupation. Effective occupants would be able to produce marketable agricultural goods and
raise revenue, a perpetual problem for the IBEAC. The Company considered both European and
Indian settlement as a way to bring in effective occupants. The former was limited to only a few
individual settlers and a single failed settlement scheme organized by the radical socialist
Freeland Association.9 In fact, only a single European settler, Stuart Watt, settled permanently
during the IBEAC period because of transportation and communication problems.10 Indian
settlement was merely discussed and not a part of any official settlement schemes during the
Company period,11 although there was some limited unofficial Indian settlement in the interior.12
The limited nature of early European and Indian settlement with no official support from
the IBEAC illustrates how trying to attract effective occupants to the territory is linked with the
other two principles of autarky: development and financial independence. The transportation
and communication challenges that European and Indian settlers faced from the lack of
development prevented many from seeking opportunities in East Africa. Even most that did
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attempt to settle the land, like those Europeans that tried to settle the highlands under the IBEAC,
were obliged to give up. It was clear the Company could not get out of its bind. Effective
occupants, which were supposed to raise revenue and bring financial independence, would not
arrive or even be effective unless there was sufficient development, which in turn could not be
provided because of the IBEAC’s financial dependence.
However, even more so than the simple importance of the principles of autarky, the
IBEAC period highlights one of the first examples of the significance of the rhetoric of autarky
in British East Africa. As was mentioned previously, the primary concern of the FO in the
region was the Nile Valley Imperative, control of the headwaters of the Nile and rebuffing the
expansion of rival continental powers, coupled with limited expenditure for administration of the
region. Mackinnon argued that the IBEAC accomplished both of those objectives for the FO
when he appealed to Lord Salisbury for funding for the proposed railway. Although this rhetoric
was successful in convincing the SoS, it did not convince the House of Commons, which, along
with the Treasury, had an entrenched dislike of colonial expenditure.13 The rhetoric of FO
objectives obviously proved effective with the FO, but it was powerless with the bodies
concerned primarily with spending. In point of fact, the Treasury hesitated to even bring its
trimmed railroad proposal before the House of Commons.14 Both bodies did not want to be
involved in new arrangements that would need, it appeared, perpetual financial assistance. The
period of IBEAC administration therefore makes two points clear: one of the principles of
autarky must give way for self-sufficiency to be attained, and a rhetoric that appeals to the
principles of autarky is needed in order to effect policy.
“A Railway with Two Ends and No Middle”
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When Sir Arthur Hardinge, the simultaneous Consul-General of Zanzibar and first
Commissioner of the EAP, proclaimed the creation of the protectorate on 1 July 1895, he was
confronted with the same harsh reality that the IBEAC had faced.15 The administration of the
interior was still threadbare, and the communication and transportation problems that plagued the
IBEAC plagued the new protectorate. However, the assumption of control by the British
government afforded Hardinge access to capital that the IBEAC could only dream of, as the
prestige of the British Empire was now irrevocably linked to the successful administration of the
territory. Construction of the railway was finally begun thanks to two considerations: first, the
FO’s overriding need to rapidly exert control over Uganda and the headwaters of the Nile,16 and
an 1894 report by the special commissioner for Uganda, Sir Gerald Portal, that emphasized the
necessity of a railroad to answer “the all-important and overshadowing question of transport and
communications.”17 In December 1895 the first railway construction crews arrived in
Mombasa,18 and £3,000,000 was initially granted by the House of Commons for its
construction.19
However, the initial allocation of capital was not the end of the business. By 1899 it was
clear that the cost of construction of the railway would go well beyond the initial £3,000,000.
The FO was forced to go before the House of Commons to argue for additional expenditure. The
debate took place on 30 April 1900 and was opened by the Undersecretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, William Broderick. Broderick began by telling the House that it was only realized
within the last fifteen months that the money would run out. He stressed that the miscalculation
was “not, as far as I can judge, to be attributed to any want of foresight or assiduity in the
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forecast of those responsible for the inception of the railway.”20 Rather, the initial estimates
were imperfect as “practically no survey had been made at all” of the 580 miles that the railway
was to cross.21 While a party of “engineer officers” was dispatched to survey the land, the
hostile nature of the land and people occasioned it to be anything but accurate, and most of the
amounts of materials estimated were drastically underestimated. Broderick highlighted this by
pointing out that “in regard to bridges, surveys had been made at the dry period of the year, and
at that time it was impossible to tell from the appearance of the stream what would be necessary
in bridge building to meet the requirements in time of flood.”22 The problems arising from
inadequate survey naturally led to an increase in expenditure, but, Broderick argued, there were
“two main causes” that necessitated the extra sum other than surveys: a change in the nature of
the railway itself, and the change in costs of carriage and materials.
The change in the nature of the railway required a major increase in cost. Broderick
made it clear to the Commons that the original conception of the railway was no longer feasible.
As he reminded the members, “the original project accepted by Parliament was that, seeing that
there would be but a moderate amount of traffic on this line of railway, in the first instance there
should be no attempt at elaborate construction with all the appurtenances of a complete railway,
a full equipment of locomotives, or anything elaborate in the way of railway stations, that there
should be no attempt to do more than was done with the Egyptian railway, to carry the line as
rapidly as possible across the desert.”23 This “unfinished line,” Broderick continued, “was
absolutely impracticable and would have been false economy.”24 This kind of railway was not
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suited to the conditions of the territory.25 The labor situation also changed with the kind of
railway. It was originally envisioned that cheap local African labor could be procured for the
“unfinished line,” but the new demands on labor made Africans resistant to employment on the
line. Therefore, the FO was forced to bring in Indian laborers from the subcontinent in order to
make up for the labor shortage. Broderick emphasized that “whereas it was estimated that
actual natives would provide something like half the labor required, the remainder being
obtained from India, in practice it has been found that of 16,000 men employed 14,000 had been
obtained from India.”26 The hefty wage difference between Indian and African laborers,
combined with the cost of transporting them to the railway and maintaining them, was one of the
chief sources of unforeseen outlay.27
The second major cause of cost was the difference in expected transportation.
Construction, Broderick told the Commons, was carried out by using “the telescopic method, by
which the line as constructed carried its own supplies day by day.”28 This system was estimated
to cost 1d. per ton, but, crucially, it also assumed that the locomotives would be able to use the
water of the region for their operation. Unfortunately, owing to the inadequate initial survey, it
was found that the local water “had in it chemical properties which made it impossible to use for
the purposes of locomotion.”29 Suitable water therefore had to be brought in from the coast
along with the rest of the supplies and more than doubled the cost of transportation from 1d. per
ton to 2¼d. per ton.30 This, along with the increase in the market price of materials like rails,
locomotives, and ballast, formed the second major contributor to greater expenditure.31
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However, the FO minister finished his case by noting that not all news from the railway
was bad. It was already drastically reducing the cost of transportation within the EAP. The
difference in cost of transportation between the railway and porterage was 2¼ d. to 7s. 4d. per
ton per mile respectively. Broderick underscored the difference by applying it to the amount of
material transported in the EAP in 1899, 4,900 tons. He argued that the material difference
between £39,000 and £294,000 in transportation costs, along with the additional safety of the
cargo, justified the railway in itself.32 Even so, there was still the proposition of revenue the
railway would accrue from trade. Based on a report from Sir Harry Johnston, the railway could
expect to receive at a minimum £120,000 in revenue per annum when it is finished. Broderick
reminded the House that this was almost double the £61,000 that was anticipated five years ago
when the railway was approved, and so it was more than reasonable to expect even more revenue
than currently projected.33 With all of the causes of expenditure and the benefits of the railway
laid out, he moved that £1,930,000 be allocated to the construction.34
After the motion was proposed, Broderick’s arguments were viciously attacked. The first
attacks came from Henry Labouchere, the Member for Northampton. He began by calling the
competence of the FO into question. Flipping Broderick’s contention that the FO was perfectly
capable of building railroads, Labouchere said, “It seems to me that we could not have a more
clear case made out that if we ever intend again to make a railroad in any part of Africa the very
last men we should put at the head of it is a committee of Foreign Office clerks. In almost every
single instance the estimates have been wrong.”35 He then argued how the initial reason for the
construction of the railway was to curb the slave trade and economize by reduction the East
African slave squadron, but it was not reduced by a single ship. Beyond that, the FO produced
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their estimates based, not on any actual survey, but a “reconnaissance survey.” Labouchere put
the incompetence succinctly: “Major Macdonald was at the head of that survey, and when he
arrived at the mountains he did not survey any further but put upon his survey “mountains,” and
so there was practically no survey. This was the state of things in 1895. Then a bright idea
occurred to Her Majesty’s Government. They determined to have a committee of Foreign Office
clerks to look into the matter to settle how the railway was to be made and what it was going to
cost.”36 This resulted in a series of total estimates that were artificially low,37 he argued, so as to
convince Parliament that it was a worthy venture. Only after it was agreed upon by the House of
Commons did the estimate of £3,000,000 arise.38 But now the £3,000,000 was spent and 362
miles of the railroad were constructed with 221 miles left.39
While Labouchere had painted a vivid picture of FO incompetence, his argument that
caught the most traction with the other Members of the House of Commons was that he could
not see how the Uganda Railway was ever going to pay for itself. The construction was now
estimated to cost a total of £5,000,000 “and possible a good deal more.”40 Would it eventually
pay for itself, or will it be a continued strain on government finances? Labouchere hit directly at
the problem as he saw it: “[Broderick] said he would not tell us specifically what we shall gain
by this railway. The fact is he could not tell us. When I ask what we will gain by Uganda41 I am
answered, in that vague sort of way which does duty in connection with African affairs, ‘Oh, the
natives can grow wheat and coffee, which they can exchange for your cotton goods.’ I do not
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believe Uganda will ever grow wheat or coffee.”42 He used the most brutally racist language to
justify his assertion that Ugandans would not produce marketable goods. They were, in his
words, “without exception the laziest of that laziest race in the whole world, the African
negro.”43 Although he admitted that there was a certain amount of trade that could be expected
from the area, it was “not enough to make it worthwhile to build a railway 600 miles long.”44
Even the report from Undersecretary Broderick that the railway was beginning to pay for itself,
Labouchere continued, should be called into question. The passenger and goods traffic that was
bringing in revenue was either related to the construction of the railway itself or provisioning the
British garrison in the territory.45 With the limited prospects of trade and utility of the railroad,
he summarized the logic of the project as he saw it: “I have no doubt that if you make a railroad
costing £5,000,000 you will reduce the cost of carrying up provisions from the coast for the
garrison, but I have never yet heard any practical man say that it was a reasonable thing to build
a railroad 600 miles long in order to send up at a cheaper rate the amount of goods required by a
garrison of 2,000 men.”46
Labouchere’s argument about the dim financial prospects of the Uganda railway were
carried on by several other members of the House of Commons. James Bryce, the Member for
Aberdeen South, pressed Broderick for both the estimates of probable traffic and the working
expenses of the railroad in order to have a better view of “the financial aspect of the question,
and how the old debt is to be covered.”47 Sir Robert Perks, the Member for Louth, repeated the
call for clear estimates and receipts after roundly condemning the administrative failings of the
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FO.48 However, as the debate moved towards the condition and wages of railroad laborers,
Thomas Gibson Bowles, the Member for King’s Lynn, drew it back to the question of whether
the British taxpayer could ever hope to recoup the cost of the railway. In fact, the costs of it
might be much more than explicitly stated from the construction estimates. If there is little to no
trade and revenue from the running of the railway, the British Treasury will be forced to continue
providing funds for it. Gibson Bowles drew upon Labouchere’s criticism of Ugandans, as well
as the relative emptiness of the interior of the EAP, to support his point. When the construction
is finally done, he reasoned, “It will be a railway with two ends and no middle. There is no
possible traffic along the route. The whole of the traffic will be between the two ends, and for
that traffic we are dependent on the probability of Uganda beginning to grow wheat, which it
does not grow now, and beginning to want cotton goods, which it does not want now. In fact we
are dependent on the transformation of Uganda from its present position into an entirely new and
different country.”49 If the proposition of making back the money spent on the construction was
dependent on the complete transformation of an African society, Gibson Bowles concluded, it
was not a venture worth spending an additional £2,000,000.50
However, the debate was not singularly against the railroad and its prospects for making
it pay. Sir William Allan, the Member for Gateshead, advised a long-term view of its potential.
All railways are risky ventures more or less, and why should this one be any different? While
the line certainly had no immediate prospect of paying its own way, that precluded its potential
at a later date. Appealing to “the good guidance and enlightenment of British influence,” the
railway should be seen as a tool that could bring tremendous potential to the region, including
transforming the local population along economic lines. Allan concluded his argument by
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combining his long-term view with sound business sense: “To leave £3,000,000 lying there
without any return would be an unbusiness-like action, and I shall support the proposal to
advance the rest of the money to complete the line, leaving the future to prove who were right
and who were wrong as to the prospects of the railway.”51 Allan’s argument, combined with
Undersecretary Broderick’s tepid allusion to a report by the Special Commissioner of the
Uganda Protectorate, Sir Harry Johnston, that stated his “impressions are exceedingly favorable”
as to the prospects of the territory, formed the whole of the response in support of the new
railway expenditure.52 Despite the heavy opposition in debate, the additional funding passed by
a vote of 185 “ayes” to only 40 “noes.”53
While much of the debate was centered on the specifics of FO incompetence, like how
the construction estimates were based on an impossibly incomplete flying survey, and the wages
and conditions of African and Indian laborers, the principles of autarky formed the backbone of
the discussion of policy direction. It was only when the points related to the potential for
financial independence, development, and effective occupation were raised that the very
completion of the railway, and not just the allocation of additional money, was brought into
question. The contrast between the opening speech by Broderick and the autarkic opposition
arguments raised by Labouchere and Gibson Bowles makes it clear that the FO was not prepared
to defend its practices within the bounds of a rhetoric of autarky. Indeed, the diplomatic rhetoric
used by the FO to get the initial funding was wholly absent from the debate excepting
Broderick’s opening speech. The terms of the debate had shifted decisively to the rhetoric of
autarky.

Ibid., 322.
Ibid., 330.
53 Ibid., 334.
51
52

Ferguson 26
As the debate shifted, the interconnectedness of the principles of autarky was continually
maintained by those members of the House of Commons that utilized that rhetoric. The financial
prospects of the railway were dependent on the development of the territory into wheat and
coffee growing areas with a local population that had both the knowledge and inclination to grow
them. Both Labouchere and Gibson Bowles argued that if the railway was to pay for itself, the
territory must be “transformed” along the lines of development and effective occupation. The
core of their argument was that such a transformation did not appear to be evident at the time.
Only Sir William Allan contended that it would be unreasonable to preclude that possibility and
stop the construction short of Lake Victoria, but he also conceded to Labouchere and Gibson
Bowles’s central point that a transformation was needed.
The extent of the change in the terms of the debate was exemplified in 1902 when the FO
was forced to go back to the House of Commons to request more money. As with the request in
1900, Lord Cranborne, Broderick’s successor as Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and
the son of Lord Salisbury, placed the blame of overspending on inadequate surveys made in 1900
and the change in the market values of materials, like coal for the locomotives.54 However,
unlike Broderick, Lord Cranborne made reference to the principles of autarky in his opening
speech and dispensed entirely with the original strategic concerns of the FO. He did not “make
any promise as to the prospects of the line,” but he did try to stress the real possibility of the
transformation discussed in 1900. Drawing on the reports of notable experts of Africa and the
changes of the past two years, he emphasized the principles of autarky in his own way:
Trade there is now in its infancy, but the country is a very fertile one, and capitalists in
England are showing a willingness to venture considerable sums in concessions which we
are granting for trade. But I may say that the opinions of Sir George Goldie and Sir
Harry Johnston are again favourable, the former saying he has not a shadow of doubt that
ultimately the line will prove a sound commercial speculation, and the latter predicting
that in ten years’ time the railway will be returning a handsome profit on working
54
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expenses, which may enable the Government to pay back to the nation the original cost of
its construction. The value of the railway, moreover, is not to be calculated only by its
promise of a direct return. There is a considerable indirect economy, because all that is
required for the development of the country is now so much more cheaply introduced.55
. . . In the progress of administration and in the comfort of the people the railway will be
an unexampled blessing. The journey from London to the capital of Uganda can now be
made, according to Sir Harry Johnston, in twenty-four days, as compared with four
months in former times, and the natives will be able to avail themselves of these great
advantages when they go in quest of more profitable employment on the coast, or when
they seek to sell their products. In fact, from the native point of view, the commercial
advantage of the railway can not be over-estimated.56
Interestingly, besides the simple appeals to the principles of autarky to pay off the costs of the
railway, Lord Cranborne made a new argument on behalf of the railway. By advocating the
“indirect economy” of the railway, he placed development as the end in itself over the simple
recovery of construction costs. The rhetoric of autarky therefore appears to change not just the
style and substance of the debate, but also the end goals of such debate. The experiences of
requesting money for the construction of the Uganda Railway had changed the way the FO
viewed its administration of East Africa. International grand strategy was no longer the
motivating force in FO policy discussion; the principles of autarky had taken over.
The Search for Effective Occupants
In no other guise was the shift to the principles of autarky more noticeable than in the FO
drive for settlement. Indeed, it is easy to see from the arguments over the railway that effective
occupation was an overriding concern. The arguments of Labouchere and Gibson Bowles
centered on their contention that the local African population would not make effective use of
the natural wealth of the land nor engage in trade if the railway was completed. Gibson Bowles
pressed the idea further when he gave the imagery of the railway as having two ends but no
middle. In all of these arguments, the simple response appeared to be the settlement of a
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population that would make effective use of the natural wealth of the land, like the Utopians of
Saint Thomas More.57 The inevitable questions for the FO became who would be the most
effective occupant and where would they be most effective. They would be answered in the
several settlement schemes tried by the FO.
The natural settlement scheme for the tropical EAP appeared to be Indian settlement.
Prior to the construction of the railway, most of the traders in the Protectorate were Indian, the
penal code was borrowed from India, the currency was Indian, and most soldiers and laborers on
the railway were Indian.58 Sir John Kirk, the Consul at Zanzibar from 1873 to 1889, even used
to refer to East Africa as “India’s America.”59 This obvious connection was picked up at the FO
by Sir Clement Hill, the Superintendent of the African Protectorates Department. He noted in a
minute on a dispatch that the FO was “rather looking to India for our East African system and for
development,”60 and even proposed asking the Treasury for £1,000 to assist prospective Indian
settlers.61
Despite the seeming logic of Hill’s proposal, it was opposed by Sir Charles Eliot, the
successor to Sir Arthur Hardinge and second Commissioner for the EAP. He objected on the
grounds that Indian settlement should be restricted to the tropical lowlands, with the temperate
highlands of the interior reserved for Europeans. Eliot used the rhetoric of autarky to defend his
claims:
though Indians are ready to seek new markets, they do not really settle in foreign
countries. They trade there, but they desire to return to India; and it is to India that they
send their money, instead of spending it in the land of their residence. Still, Indian
cultivators would be welcome on the shores of Lake Victoria and on the coast, where it is
not likely that more white men will live than those who are required for the general
supervision of estates and business. The style of cultivation practiced near Vanga, and
about the mouth of the Tana, is suitable to their aptitudes, as is also trade with the
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natives; and, as the Arab element does not seem to be on the increase, there is room for
them. . . . It may be doubted if the Highlands are really congenial to Indians. The
coolness of the climate is not appreciated by them, and the agriculture is not of the class
to which they are most accustomed. But they are keenly alive to the advantage of
acquiring valuable property, and the example of Zanzibar, where large numbers of
plantations belonging to impoverished Arabs have passed into the hands of Indians,
shows that as landowners on a large scale they are not a blessing to the country, inasmuch
as they do not spend money on improving their estates, but merely bleed them in order to
send it to India.62
Eliot reasoned that development and effective occupation could be achieved by
restricting Indian access to land in the highlands. History had shown that Indians did not have a
vested interest in developing and investing in the estates they settle in foreign countries. If this
was the case, they would certainly not be the kind of settler that the EAP needed; they even had
the potential to be dangerous, as was already seen in Zanzibar. Yet, Eliot was not against all
Indian settlement. In fact, he argued that it could be advantageous in the tropical lowlands and in
towns. Eliot’s position was simply one that tried to put the settler that would make the most of
the land where they would be most effective.63 This is further supported by his focus on the
business habits of Indians rather than his argument of environmental suitability. He reasoned
that even if Indians wanted to settle in the highlands it would, as history has shown, result in land
speculation rather than the desired development and agriculture.64 Clement Hill accepted Eliot’s
arguments because they promoted both Indian and European settlement, although in different
regions of the territory.65
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FO acceptance of European settlement in the White Highlands, as they came to be called,
did not necessarily mean that a purely racial logic was applied to settlement. The principles of
autarky were equally applied to Europeans. In other words, a European had to be the “right kind
of settler” to have access to the land. This kind of thinking was clearly illustrated in the FO’s
abortive Jewish Settlement scheme. Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
from 1895 to 1903, proposed the scheme to the FO and the leader of the Zionist movement
Theodor Herzl as a response to a new wave of violent anti-Semitic pogroms in Eastern Europe in
1902. The scheme never received support from either Commissioner Eliot nor Lord Lansdowne,
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the time. They both objected on the grounds that
Jews did not make good agriculturalists; just the kind of settler that was needed to promote the
principles of autarky. Lord Lansdowne was particularly hostile in his assessment writing in one
instance that “even if the Jews had a garden of Eden to go to, they would . . . probably fail if they
were set down in it by themselves to knock a living out of the soil.”66 He repeated this sentiment
in a dispatch to Eliot in October, 1903 when he noted, “these people do not as a rule make good
agriculturalists. Our experience all over the world is that they take to ‘les petits metiers’ but not
to farming.”67 The combination of official hostility to the scheme and the division in Zionist
circles as to the virtues of the scheme led to its eventual demise.68
The Jewish Settlement scheme was a clear example of the rhetoric of autarky in policy
decision-making. This was a scheme that, if the conventional knowledge of a racist British
policy in the White Highlands is applied, should have been officially encouraged. A willing
group of Europeans wanted to make a permanent home in the EAP. Yet, this was not the case.
The Jews were not seen as good potential farmers, and therefore not effective occupants that
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would further the goals of development and financial independence. It is a testament to the
versatility of the rhetoric of autarky that both the rejection of Indian and Jewish settlement in the
Highlands, could be successfully argued from two different perspectives while simultaneously
appealing to the same principles. In other words, the rhetoric of autarky can adapt to the given
circumstances and conform the debate to its principles.
Adopting and Adapting
This was the case in all of the examples raised in this chapter. The harsh economic
reality of the territory forced the IBEAC to think of their administrative policy in terms of the
principles of autarky, and when they used the rhetoric of FO grand strategy they did not convince
the Treasury and House of Commons to grant them aid and collapsed. The debate over
continued funding for the construction of the Uganda Railway forced the FO to learn the
rhetorical lesson they did not with the IBEAC’s requests for funding. Using a rhetoric purposebuilt for their internal needs, the FO was excoriated on the floor of the House of Commons in
terms alien to its normal functions.69 This shock forced the FO to change its approach both to
administration in the EAP and how it constructed its arguments requesting more money. The
change in administration to better correspond to the principles of autarky is evident in the
arguments for restricting Indian and Jewish settlement in the White Highlands as official policy.
Beyond showing the versatility of the rhetoric of autarky, the examples of it in action set
important precedents for later administration of the EAP. The FO learned the lessons of the
IBEAC period of administration and used the principles of autarky to guide their policy while
also using its rhetoric to get its way with the House of Commons. The precedent set by Eliot and

Sir Robert Perks, the Member for Louth, made a similar point in condemning the state of construction affairs
managed by the FO. He posited that the members of the FO were not mere clerks, but gentlemen who were expert
in all things diplomatic; an upbringing that made them naturally poor construction managers. The logic is identical
in claiming that a corps of diplomats would be poorly versed in the intricacies of finance and administration. Parl.
Deb. (Commons), 4th Ser., 82 (April 30, 1900): 308-309.
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the FO in White Highlands settlement would be maintained for decades and use the same
principles to uphold it in the face of ever-growing opposition. With these precedents established,
it is necessary to examine the ubiquity of the rhetoric of autarky in a variety of different
administrative contexts and under the auspices of an entirely different governmental department,
the CO.
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Chapter 3
The “Prime Mover” of Policy
The Historiography of a Department Transfer
The administration of the East Africa Protectorate (EAP) was transferred from the
Foreign Office (FO) to the Colonial Office (CO) on 1 April 1905. The transfer was significant
for a variety of reasons. First, the organization of the CO was significantly different from the FO
with respect to colonial administration. The African territories entrusted to the care of the FO
were run, ostensibly, by a single man, Sir Clement Hill, who led the Africa Department therein.
While Hill frequently sought the advice of other departments for experience and precedents, like
the CO for land and legal issues, the India Office for Indian experience, and the War Office for
help with the military expeditions in the EAP, he struggled with the practical running of the
territory.1 This largely stemmed from the operational and rhetorical focus of the FO on
diplomatic concerns, as stated in the previous chapter,2 as well as the limited staff he had at his
disposal. By contrast, the CO had a larger, specialized staff that had a wealth of previous
practical colonial experience.3 It was hoped by some, especially settlers and colonial officials
who had grievances with the FO policy regime, that the transfer would mark a change in policy
direction for their benefit. The European settlers in particular thought that the experience of the
CO with other settler colonies would mark the easing of land regulations in the EAP and the
progress of the territory to Crown Colony status and eventually responsible self-government.4

Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 16-17.
This is clearly shown in the diplomatic focus and rhetoric used by the FO during the IBEAC period and the early
half of its administration of the EAP. It was that focus that led to the problems of administration prior to the
utilization of the principles of autarky as expressed in the previous chapter.
3 Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 136-137.
4 Elspeth Huxley, White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya (London: Chatto and Windus,
1935): I. 193.
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Nevertheless, the hopes many had that the transfer would mean a decisive shift in East
African policy, either more pro-settler or pro-African interests, were soon dashed. A general
continuity of policy from the FO to the CO was maintained with reference to the “broad strokes”
of land, development, and finance; European settlers continued to come into the EAP to demand
land, the colonial government sought ways to develop the land, and bringing in capital to make
the colony pay was still a priority. Historians have attributed this to a variety of causes. Elspeth
Huxley argues that the change in government in London and the personalities at the head of the
CO were to blame.5 Thinking of the broad responsibility of the CO, George Bennett posits the
moderated policy stemmed from the CO trying to model the EAP on West African experience,
while also understanding that Eliot’s decision to alienate land to European settlers was
“fundamental and irreversible.”6 M. P. K. Sorrenson and G. H. Mungeam both approach the
continuity of policy in personal terms, but in different ways. Sorrenson argues that the
institutional practices of the CO allowed the agency of junior officials to significantly impact
decision-making. He uses the example of the first-class clerk W. D. Ellis7 and his personal
views having a disproportionate effect on the direction of the EAP, while the political heads, like
Lyttelton, Elgin, and Churchill, did little to effect change beyond small interjections.8 Mungeam,
likewise, places much responsibility for continuity at the top of both the CO and in the EAP itself
with commissioners like Sir Donald Stewart and Sir James Hayes Sadler. The lack of leadership
from these men, along with inheriting the precedent of policy confusion from the FO, Mungeam

Ibid., 193-195. While it can be argued that Huxley is not a historian properly understood, her arguments are
included because she gives a valid account of the transition.
6 Bennett, Kenya, 19-20.
7 William Mercer, The Colonial Office List for 1905 (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1905), 504. Like most CO
officials he studied the Classics at Oxford and was appointed a clerk at the CO in 1895. In 1899, he was made a
first-class clerk after serving as private secretary to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Selbourne, in
1897.
8 Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement, 83-87.
5

Ferguson 35
argues, led to concerns for African interests being limited to minutes in dispatches rather than an
active change in policy.9
Still other historians argue that the handover of responsibility led to a real shift in policy.
Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, for example, imply a change in policy when they write that
the transfer “brought the Protectorate under the control of a department actively concerned with
tropical development for metropolitan needs.”10 This position is maintained by the difference of
institutional policy focuses between the FO and the CO. The synoptic view of that difference
shows the FO concerned with the extension of government control, and the CO concerned with
development as evidenced by the agenda started under the secretaryship of Joseph Chamberlain
and continued by his immediate successors, Alfred Lyttelton and Lord Elgin.11
Interestingly, every one of these accounts of the continuity or discontinuity of policy
from FO control to CO control is valid in its own way. This leads to the stimulating thought that
they cannot contradict each other so long as they are not true in the same sense at the same time.
Upon reinspection, one will notice that they do not, in fact, contradict each other, although these
accounts do give different angles and perspectives thus giving the appearance of contradiction.
The clearest example of the appearance of contradiction in the examples presented will prove the
point: the argument by Berman and Lonsdale, that the transfer did cause a change in policy,
versus the others, that there was no real change in policy. The contradiction appears clear; they
cannot both be true in the same sense and at the same time. However, they are not true at the
same time. There was a shift in policy, but it did not come from the institutional change from the

Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 136-141.
Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa: State and Class (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 1993), 86.
11 For an account of Joseph Chamberlain’s impact on the developmental focus of the CO, see Robert Kubicek, The
Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969),
chapters 4, 6-8. For an account of Lord Elgin’s developmental policies, see Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at
the Colonial Office, 1905-1908: The Watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1968), chapter
12.
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FO to the CO in 1905. As the previous chapter demonstrated through the examination of the
parliamentary debate surrounding the Uganda Railway and the EAP, the shift to “tropical
development for metropolitan” from diplomatic concerns came from within the FO in 1901 and
1902. Indeed, Berman and Lonsdale are correct that a shift to administrative focus on
development had occurred, but not at the time and in the way they argue.
The same can be said of the other historians’ accounts of the period and official decisionmaking. The personalities of officials, the institutional practices of the CO,12 and the power of
precedent all impacted the apparent broad continuity of FO policy by the CO. Actually, these
accounts not only avoid contradiction, but also support each other. One only needs to look at the
different broad reasons for continuity of policy to see the validity of this claim: the institutional
practices of the CO enabled the personalities of officials to affect policy to the extent that they
did, precedent was promoted as an institutional practice, and precedent allowed the personalities
of officials to affect policy long after their time in office.13 If all of these accounts support each
other in one way or another, it is impossible for one of them to be the “prime mover” of decisionmaking. They are simply surface examinations of a deeper system that operated through the
personalities of officials, institutional practices, and precedent to achieve its goals.14
This chapter will show that the principles and rhetoric of autarky are the “prime mover”
of policy in the EAP. This will be done by examining three different policy discussions in the
months immediately following the transfer of the EAP to CO responsibility. By looking at the
intricate relationship between different individual officials within the framework of institutional

Institutional practices here are defined as the practices used by the CO to keep its operations and decision-making
going. This includes, but is not limited to, dispatch writing and official minuting, the hierarchy of officials, requests
for advice from other departments, and so on.
13 These are just a few of the many potential broad examples that can be formed and are purely illustrating the
validity of the claim.
14 The analogy of doctors diagnosing the symptoms of a disease rather than the disease itself is apt. However, the
obvious negative reference to the principles of autarky as a disease would necessarily give a moral judgement to this
system that is beyond the scope and purpose of this work.
12
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practice at the CO and the power of precedent over a variety of distinctive discussions, two
points will be made clear. First, that the principles and rhetoric of autarky operate within and
even co-opt the three factors of individual personalities, institutional practice, and precedent to
further the goal of autarky. Second, that the principles and rhetoric of autarky are not limited to
a few specific policy discussions but found in a variety of seemingly unrelated discussions.15
With the parameters of the chapter set, it is time to turn to the first account, the case of deporting
undesirables16 from the protectorate and one unfortunate man in particular.
The Unfortunate Mr. Fooks
On 4 May, just a month after the transfer of responsibility, the CO requested that the
commissioner of the EAP, Sir Donald Stewart, send a report “on the difficulties experienced in
deporting undesirables from the Protectorate.”17 Stewart promptly responded with a dispatch on
5 June. In that report, he briefly covered the legal measures afforded to the EAP and the
problems it faced. The subject of deportation was covered in a 1902 Order in Council that
established two essential points. First, that the place of deportation “shall be a place in some part
(if any) of His Majesty’s dominions to which the person belongs, or the Government of which
consents to the reception of persons deported under this Order, or to some place under the
Protection of His Majesty.”18 And second, that all the associated costs of deportation should be
covered as the Secretary of State for the Colonies (SoSC) directs. Stewart continued that the first
problem of deportation facing the EAP was finding places willing to take in the potential

Inevitably, a chapter structured around identifying and examining relatively unrelated policy discussions will not
have a traditional historical narrative flow. While there will be a degree of continuity from one discussion or
dispatch to the next, the purpose of this chapter is not to give a complete account of each discussion. Some of the
policy issues under debate would not be settled until many years later, and to follow each to their conclusion would
belabor the point. The next chapter will follow a single policy, the East African Soldier Settlement Scheme, from its
proposal in 1916 to its conclusion in 1921.
16 Undesirables was a catch-all term for criminals and others who were “dangerous to peace and good order.”
17 Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2. The 4 May request was fully referred to in this dispatch, and I
could not find the original request dispatch in the 533 series.
18 Ibid.
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deportees. He noted that the number of undesirables had increased in the wake of the Boer War
and many territories refused deportees to land.19 Stewart put the problem succinctly, “It has thus
become practically impossible to find a part of H.M. dominions the Government of which will
consent to receive undesirable bad characters, a considerable number of whom are, I regret to
say, resident in East Africa.”20 With no governments voluntarily taking them in, Stewart placed
the burden on the CO and the SoSC. He wrote to the SoSC, “The only alternative that remains is
to return them to their place of origin, which, if the place of origin is England, would be a costly
proceeding. I have the honour to request your instructions as to how this cost should be
defrayed.”21 Stewart continued by telling Lyttelton he intended to deport undesirables who
finished their jail sentences in the EAP and that he proposed “taking steps shortly to prevent as
far as possible undesirables from landing in East Africa.”22
To give substance to his concerns with the undesirables, Stewart gave a specific example
of the type of person “likely to be dangerous to peace and good order.”23 He picked out a single
man, Arthur Pelham Fooks, and attached a sworn statement by Robert William Hamilton, a
judge of the high court, attesting to his criminal record and character. The short statement read:
“That Arthur Pelham Fooks was in June 1900 convicted in Mombasa of theft and sentenced to 3
months imprisonment since that date he has been twice convicted of vagrancy in Mombasa. In
February 1905 he was convicted in Mombasa of forgery for the purpose of cheating. He is in my
opinion a bad character and his remaining here would be dangerous to the good order of the

Stewart made specific reference to the South African Colonies and Aden. Ibid.
Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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Protectorate.”24 Stewart told the CO that Fooks was “an instance of the kind of person
frequently met with here.”25
A month later on 7 July, W. D. Ellis, a first-class clerk, began the discussion within the
CO. He minuted that the provisions of the Order in Council that commissioner Stewart had cited
“were not meant to meet the case of ordinary thieves and rogues such as the persons referred to
in his dispatch.”26 These types of persons must be dealt with by imprisonment.27 Additionally,
this principle, if accepted, would lead to ill will between the different parts of the empire as they
would engage in a competition of shunting their undesirables on each other. Ellis also wanted to
make clear to Stewart that the power of transfer for the purpose of imprisonment was different
than the power of deportation and the latter “should only be used for political offenders.”28 He
concluded by noting that “there is no objection in principle to legislation for the exclusion of
undesirables. We shall be glad to see the draft of what he proposes.”29 Herbert Read, the
principal clerk of the newly formed East African Department of the CO, merely added that they
send a copy of FO correspondence about excluding undesirables from immigrating to Zanzibar
to assist Stewart’s legal advisors in preparing a draft ordinance.30 On 16 August, Lyttelton sent
the CO’s response, a combination of the sentiments in Ellis’s and Read’s minutes, to Stewart and
also sent a copy of the whole correspondence to the FO for review.31

Sworn statement by R.W. Hamilton, 20 February 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO
533/2.
25 Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
26 Minute by Ellis, 7 July 1905, on Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
27 Ellis’s original minute stated that these persons must be dealt with by imprisonment in the protectorate, but
Reginald Antrobus, an assistant undersecretary, commented in the column that “in the protectorate” should be
omitted from any response to the commissioner because the Order in Council allowed for sentences of imprisonment
to be carried out elsewhere. Ibid.
28 Minute by Ellis, 7 July 1905, on Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
29 Ibid.
30 Minute by Read, 8 July 1905, on Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
31 Lyttelton to Stewart, 16 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/2; Cox to Lansdowne, 16 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
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Here in the opening months of CO administration of the EAP the prominence of the
principles of autarky is clear. Stewart’s request to remove people deemed “dangerous to the
good order of the Protectorate” is an attempt to foster effective occupation, development, and
even financial independence. Using the character assessment of Fooks as an example, he sought
to convince the officials in the CO that undesirables of that sort impede the development of the
EAP. To remove this impediment to development, Stewart tried to remove those undesirables
that were already in the jails of the EAP and to prevent others from entering the protectorate.
This proposed control of the “kind of person” who enters the protectorate invoked the principle
of effective occupation. And finally, by attempting to put the cost of the proposed deportations
on the CO, Stewart was keeping the financial independence of the EAP in mind.
The power of using a rhetoric steeped in the principles of autarky is obvious when
examining the CO’s response to Stewart’s dispatch. No official raised an objection in principle
to the commissioner’s proposals to deport those undesirables already in the EAP and refusing
others to enter. Instead, there were two serious reasons for objecting to deportation that made it
a nonnegotiable point. First, the CO was bound by the legal technicality that the 1902 Order in
Council only allowed deportations of political enemies and not common criminals. Second, even
if this could be circumvented, deporting criminals to other territories would lead to a competition
among all the different territories to send their criminals to each other and make management of
the myriad parts of the empire difficult for the CO. It is important to note that the cost of
potential deportations to England was not discussed by CO officials, giving the impression,
along with the complete absence of objections in principle to criminal deportations, that the CO
might have accepted them absent the two reasons they discussed.32 This is further supported by
the CO’s willingness to entertain an ordinance to exclude undesirables. Going above and beyond
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simple acquiescence, the CO sent a copy of FO correspondence on the subject of the restriction
of immigrants into Zanzibar to assist Stewart’s legal advisors in crafting a workable ordinance
and concluded by noting they “shall be glad to see the Ordinance in draft form before it is
enacted.”33 Using the rhetoric of autarky, Stewart was able to get as favorable a response from
the CO as he could in the face of nonnegotiable objections.
A Dentist’s Appeal to Autarky
The rhetoric of autarky was also used by private individuals. Five days after sending the
dispatch on undesirables, commissioner Stewart sent a dispatch on 10 June to the CO requesting
the approval of a lease of land for a South African dentist, Dr. Frederick E. Doering from
Transvaal.34 The lease of land to Dr. Doering had been under consideration by the FO for almost
two years prior, and the current dispatch was a continuation of that correspondence. Stewart
attached a copy of a draft of the lease that was approved by both himself and Dr. Doering’s local
legal representative, Neil MacGregor, along with a letter of stated intentions by MacGregor. The
commissioner argued his position succinctly:
Dr. Doering is willing to invest more capital than any other farmer in the country, and I
think his application should be entertained. It will cost him with imported sheep, houses,
fencing, kraals, etc., not less than £25,000 in the first three years, and he is quite
agreeable to spend that amount if he is granted the area he asks for. He proposes to breed
sheep on a large scale or not at all and from all I can find out about him he is a man of
large means and can provide the money. The Protectorate is urgently in need of men
with capital to help in its development, and I sincerely hope you will see your way to
sanction Dr. Doering’s application.35
Stewart was “most anxious” to get a speedy response and requested a telegram if the CO agreed
with him as Dr. Doering was beginning to look into investing in Argentina.36

Lyttelton to Stewart, 16 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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The draft lease attached to the dispatch provided support for commissioner Stewart’s
argument. The draft lease gave Dr. Doering 25,000 acres in the Rift Valley for a period of 99
years and provided protections for the interests of the EAP. To make certain that the land would
be developed as argued, the lease made two binding covenants with the lessee. First, it explicitly
required the doctor to “use the said land for the purposes of stock raising and agriculture, and
will within three years from the date [of the signing of the lease] import stock on the said land
not less than five thousand sheep from New Zealand or Australia.” Second, it prevented Dr.
Doering from subletting “or otherwise part with the possession of the said land or any part
thereof without the previous consent of the Commissioner in writing thereto.”37 Neil MacGregor
signed the draft lease to show the government that it had both his and Dr. Doering’s approval.38
To give further evidence of Dr. Doering’s intentions to develop his proposed lease,
Stewart included a letter from MacGregor that outlined his plans and expected difficulties. He
wrote that Dr. Doering intended to import the 5,000 merino sheep stipulated in the lease which
he estimated to bring “not less than £18,000” into the protectorate. The primary idea behind the
sheep was to cross stud rams with the local ewes “to develop a merino sheep producing a wool
fit to compete in the London markets.”39 MacGregor highlighted the possibilities, “the
establishment of such an industry on a large scale must be of incalculable benefit to the country,
whilst a successful cross with the native sheep opens up a wide field for enterprise.”40 He also
underlined the difficulties inherent in such a project: constructing fences, yards, and shearing
sheds; continued expenditure for three or even five years without a return; disastrous local stock
diseases; and the dangers to the stock of long and hazardous transportation. In addition to sheep,
Dr. Doering planned to experiment with horses, ostriches, and goats, and he even had “a scheme

Draft Indenture, 22 May 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
Ibid.
39 Letter by Neil MacGregor, 26 May 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
40 Ibid.
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to erect an electric plant on the Gilgil River, provided that stream is strong enough to generate
sufficient power to justify the erection of cold storage works.”41 With a specific plan for
development laid out, it was left to the CO to determine approval of the lease.
In a long minute, Herbert Read addressed the concerns of the CO and the precedent
established by the FO. The FO had requested advice from the CO on the subject of Dr.
Doering’s proposed grant of land back in March 1905. Read began his minute by quoting the
CO response at length:
With regard to the area of the proposed grant it appears to Mr. Lyttelton that, if 10,000
acres is the normal maximum and if 20,000 acres and 18,000 acres were only leased to
Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Flemmer respectively because they had been led by Sir Charles
Eliot to expect much larger grants, it may be difficult to justify a lease of 25,000 acres to
Dr. Doering. It will also be remembered that certain general arguments against land
grants on a large scale were used by the FO in the correspondence with Sir Charles Eliot
on the subject of the grants to Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Flemmer. But if the Marquess of
Lansdowne is of opinion that the action of the government can nevertheless be justified in
the present instance, Mr. Lyttelton does not desire to raise any objection to the proposed
lease on these grounds.42
Here Read was referring to the earlier scandal surrounding the previous commissioner of
the EAP, Sir Charles Eliot, where he promised large grants of land to two South Africans who
promoted land grants in the protectorate without reference to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Lord Lansdowne.43 To maintain a continuity of policy, the approval of Dr. Doering’s
lease needed to match with previous arguments and opinions. The CO response brought up
several potential objections to approving the lease, but it left the decision to Lord Lansdowne at
the FO. However, as Read noted immediately after the quote. “the FO did not commit

Ibid.
Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2. Most of the names and
longer words were handwritten in shorthand, but are transcribed here at length.
43 Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement, 74-76. Eliot was forced to resign his commissionership over his
actions.
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themselves to any expression of opinion on the subject . . . we have therefore to decide the
question for ourselves.”44
Read continued to look at arguments mentioned by the FO to decide the question of the
lease. Again, Read quoted a section from a dispatch of Lord Lansdowne from October 1903 to
give the FO’s general argument against large grants of land. Lansdowne argued that with the
large land projects of the East Africa Syndicate45 and the Jewish Settlement Scheme underway at
the time, large personal grants should be postponed.46 However, Read pointed out that the
newspapers “of two or three days ago” reported that the Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland
voted to reject the Settlement Scheme. Therefore, he argued, Dr. Doering’s proposed grant did
not need to be rejected along the same lines.47
The next point Read considered was whether Dr. Doering’s grant would give
Chamberlain and Flemmer “any just cause of complaint of unequal treatment.”48 He made two
different arguments as to why they should have no complaint. First, their draft leases needed to
be sanctioned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he offered them smaller grants of
land which they accepted. These grants of large concessions, Read continued, “must be decided
on their respective merits and the SoSC is perfectly justified in making a larger grant to Dr.
Doering than to Mr. Chamberlain or Mr. Flemmer if he considers that the special [circumstances]
of the case warrant it.”49 Second, Dr. Doering’s draft lease was not more liberal in its
requirements than those of Chamberlain and Flemmer. Chamberlain would have 20,000 acres

Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
The East Africa Syndicate was an early capitalist venture that was granted a 500 square mile lease in the Rift
Valley by the FO in December 1903. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 104, 113.
46 Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2. The Jewish Settlement
Scheme had not yet been finally decided in official circles.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. It is important to note that the decision to approve large grants of land over 10,000 acres was left to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs while the FO was responsible for the EAP and by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies after the CO assumed responsibility.
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leased for 99 years at a rent of ½ anna per acre with £3,125 to be spent in development for the
first five years. Flemmer, likewise, would lease at ½ anna per acre for 99 years, but would have
18,000 acres and spend £2,812 in development for the first five years. However, Dr Doering’s
draft lease had important differences. He would lease 25,000 acres for 99 years at rent of 1 anna
per acre and spend not less than £18,000 in development in the first 3 years.50 Read was
therefore justified in concluding that “on the whole Dr. Doering’s grant appears to be much less
favorable than the grants to the other two.”51 In the margin, Lyttelton agreed with Read, but
noted that the CO must have a “good window into Dr. Doering’s financial standing” to
proceed.52 Read finished his minute by reasoning that the requirements of the draft lease to
import sheep and spend a set amount in development, along with the provisions of the Crown
Lands Ordinance of 1902 such as the reservation of minerals on the property, were sufficient
safeguards of the government’s interests.53
In a minute responding directly to Read, Sir Montagu Ommanney, the Permanent
Undersecretary of State for the Colonies,54 stated that he agreed with his assessments, but wanted
three clarifications. First, as a legal formality, Ommaney wanted the lease to include the price
and requirements for converting leased land into freehold so that it was the same as the other
large grants. Second, he was “not clear as to the clause relating to placing sheep on the land; if it
is a mere obligation to import it covers very little. Aught it not to be ‘import and maintain on the
land’?”55 Third, Ommaney repeated Lyttleton’s marginal question about Dr. Doering’s finances
pointedly: “Has anyone ever obtained any evidence as to Dr. Doering’s alleged wealth?”56
Ibid.
Ibid.
52 Minute by Lyttelton, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
53 Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
54 A former private secretary to the SoSC the Earl of Carnarvon from 1874 to 1877 and a commissioned crown agent
afterward, Ommanney was made Permanent SoSC in 1900 and resigned in 1907. William Mercer, The Colonial
Office List for 1905 (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1905), 555.
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Finally, in a minute addressed to Lyttelton, Ommaney thought that the lease should be approved
so long as the change to the importation clause be implemented and Dr. Doering furnish “a
satisfactory reference to his bankers.”57 Only two days after Read and Ommaney’s minutes, the
CO sent a telegram to Stewart approving the lease subject to Dr. Doering providing evidence of
his wealth, the clause about importing sheep was changed to “import and maintain on said land,”
and the option of converting land to freehold be included in the lease like those offered to
Chamberlain and Flemmer.58
From this debate over approving the land grant to Dr. Doering, we can draw three
conclusions: first, that the principles of autarky played a prominent role in the argument for the
lease, second, the resulting rhetoric of autarky was effective, and, third, that the principles of
autarky were the prime mover of policy. With reference to the first conclusion, all three
principles of autarky are well-represented in the argument. It was argued Dr. Doering satisfied
the idea of an effective occupant who would aid development of the EAP. He covenanted with
the government to spend at least £18,000 of his personal capital to develop his property, and the
letter by his local representative, Neil MacGregor, clearly showed this intention. Commissioner
Stewart himself even argued this point in his dispatch when he told the CO that the EAP needed
men like him; men with capital to develop the protectorate. Dr. Doering would not only make a
personally effective occupant who would develop his private property, but also contribute to the
overall development of the protectorate. MacGregor reasoned that Dr. Doering would be
invaluable to the EAP through his personal efforts to cross foreign and local stock to create a
type of wool that would be competitive with the London markets. The development of such an
internationally competitive product and an estate capable of producing it would be instrumental
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in advancing the financial independence of the EAP. This is only further supported by the fact
that the EAP would pay nothing for these developments.59 In the dispatch by Stewart, the letter
by MacGregor, and even in the draft lease itself, the principles of autarky formed the rhetorical
foundation of the argument for approving the lease.
The second conclusion, that the rhetoric of autarky used was effective, is clear in both
dispatch from Stewart and minutes by CO officials. Commissioner Stewart was so thoroughly
convinced that he even employed the same rhetoric while trying to convince Lyttelton and the
CO in his dispatch. He argued that Dr. Doering’s lease be approved and if it was, fast-tracked by
way of telegram, an expensive form of administrative communication normally reserved for
important and sensitive directives. Stewart highlighted this sense of immediacy by remarking
that Dr. Doering was starting to seek a land grant from Argentina. It easy to see the same
conviction in Herbert Read’s long minute. He endeavored to show other CO officials that a large
land grant could be approved by giving a lengthy genealogy of opinions given by both the FO
and CO on the issue of large grants in the EAP. For example, Read pointed out in the CO’s
original opinion on the matter to the FO, Lyttelton understood the general arguments against and
restrictions on large grants but left it to Lord Lansdowne to decide. When the FO did not give a
definite opinion, he argued it was up to the CO to determine whether it should be approved.
Then, Read showed that the original general arguments no longer applied to the situation, like
the land experiment of Jewish settlement. At every point, Read attempted to push towards
approval of the grant; even when he gave opposition arguments, they were only raised to show
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how they no longer were valid. Ommaney, too, only challenged the draft lease on small issues
that, when changed, made the rhetoric of autarky in the draft lease even stronger.60
The final conclusion drawn from the approval of Dr. Doering’s grant is that the principles
and rhetoric of autarky were the prime mover of policy. This was best shown by illustrating how
the rhetoric of autarky uses and even contorts the traditionally argued movers of policy: the
personalities of officials, institutional practices, and precedent. In this instance, the rhetoric of
autarky convinced the personalities of Stewart, Read, Ommaney, and Lyttelton to approve the
grant. Their personalities were not the instigating force of policy, but rather they coopted the
rhetoric of autarky. Institutional practice and precedent were also coopted by the rhetoric of
autarky. By showing how past opinions and policy directives no longer held the same weight as
circumstances changed, precedent and the institutional practice of respecting the opinions of
other departments was effectively circumvented. In fact, Read even used the precedent of
Chamberlain and Flemmer’s respective grants as points of comparison to Dr. Doering’s draft
lease to show how it ensured he would be an effective occupant helping to develop the EAP with
his own capital. In short, Dr. Doering would be promoting the principles of autarky. With the
principles and rhetoric of autarky identified as the prime mover of policy in a specific debate
over approval of a land grant, it is necessary to next turn to a debate establishing general policy
and how the principles and rhetoric of autarky were again the prime mover.
Land Policy Reconsidered
However, the principles and rhetoric of autarky directed general policy direction as well
as specific issues like the Dr. Doering lease. On 14 August, Sir Donald Stewart sent a long
dispatch responding to the recommendations of the Land Commission established in November
1904, which had only recently concluded in June 1905, to consider land complaints lodged by
This refers to the change in the lease, “import and maintain on said land,” that strengthened its development
requirements.
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settlers.61 Before giving his opinion point by point,62 he began by noting that the report of the
Land Commission embodied the views of the settlers that gave evidence before it. It was,
therefore, representative of settler views and interests. Stewart also remarked generally on the
settler dissatisfaction with the lease requirements enumerated in the Crown Lands Ordinance of
1902, the law by which leases were considered and granted. There was, he argued, “much to be
said on both sides.”63 The largest complaint was against the restriction of the free transfer of
land. Stewart laid out the situation in the EAP as he saw it:
Free transfer would bring in capital and increase speculation. The first comers who have
perhaps bought land merely as a speculation and have done no work on it would receive a
large profit by selling, and it is doubtful if the purchasers would do any more work than
their predecessors. They might simply remain in possession of the land and wait for an
opportunity to sell again at a profit. In the meantime, though money is circulated by this
method, the land itself is not developed. As the law stands at present, a man before
obtaining a transfer must show that he has done some legitimate work, and if after a
certain period no attempt is made to develop the property, the land reverts to
Government.64
Neither the prospect of free transfer and speculation nor the law as it stood were desirable.
Stewart offered a solution to this dilemma to the CO in the form of a proposal from John
Ainsworth, the Sub-Commissioner for Ukamba Province at the time. Ainsworth wrote a letter to
Stewart that explained his thinking and Stewart enclosed it in his dispatch. Ainsworth started his
letter by noting he was originally in favor of the EAP’s standing land laws. He wrote, “At a
previous point of the country’s development I was personally in favour of restricting dealings in
land, my idea being to prevent speculation and so enforce development. I was of opinion at the
time that if Government compelled a man to occupy his land under certain rules he would
Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3; Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement, 84. Stewart
sent the report of the Land Commission to the CO in a 23 June dispatch but did not offer comments as he stated he
did not have adequate time to respond in full. Stewart to Lyttelton, 23 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
62 It is more efficient to start this debate with Stewart’s dispatch than with a full account of the report of the Land
Commission itself. Stewart opines on the relevant recommendations of the report and to give both would be a mere
repetition of the relevant points and the inclusion of many that are irrelevant. The full report can be found enclosed
in Stewart to Lyttelton, 23, June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.
63 Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.
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necessarily develop it, or at the end of the period prescribed by the rules, the land, failing
development, would revert to the Crown.”65 However, Ainsworth posited that the existing
regulations did not “assist in the development we all desire.” The real value of a country, he
suggested, was from the produce of the soil not the soil itself, and, in fact, the procedure used to
allot land was actually keeping the EAP in an undeveloped state. Ainsworth gave the following
example to highlight the bureaucratic inefficiency of the situation:
A would-be settler arrives in the country, he obtains a homestead of 160 acres and preempts a further area of 480 acres. He is obliged to show the Land Officer that he has
£300, but he is not bound in any way to spend a penny of it on the land. In six months –
more or less – he finds he can do very little with the land, but he maintains his option
over the land for three years, and during all of that time the land would, under the present
rules, remain undeveloped. This means that one man who is possibly not in a position to
develop ten acres “blocks” a square mile. If this man desires to “unload” any of the land
he can only, generally speaking, do so by surrendering to the Crown, in preference to
which he retains his option for the three years.66
His solution was simple: allow settlers to freely transfer land in freehold and exact a land tax on
all unproductive or unoccupied land. While it was simply “bad policy to keep a poor man
bound” to a block of land, the free transfer of land would allow a person to sell what parts of the
land he does not want or the whole lot to a person able to develop it.67
With a possible solution to the question of land transfer proposed, commissioner Stewart
gave his opinion on certain important points raised by the Land Commission. The first set of
points he considered were the Commission’s negative assessment of several of the articles of the
Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, the first of which was article 9.68 Stewart agreed that the
article was too stringent and recommended that it be modified so that the lessee would be
returned the whole or a part of what they originally paid for the land.69 After that, however, he
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only mentioned his objections to the suggested changes to the ordinance. Stewart saw no reason
to change the article stating that all buildings on leased land should pass to the government
without compensation, because a settler that did good work on the land was “never likely” to be
withheld from renewing the lease and most leases were for 99 years. He also objected to
removing the commissioner’s consent to assign any part of a lease to another on the grounds that
it enabled “the Government to keep a check on the class of men that may come into the
country.”70 The remainder of Stewart’s objections were against removing any articles that
allowed for the public use of leased land, like traveling through the land.71
Yet while Stewart disagreed with most of the Land Commission’s recommendations
regarding the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, he agreed with many of its other general
suggestions; four of which were particularly important. First, he agreed that the capital
requirement to obtain a lease, a measure hotly objected to by the settlers, was not particularly
useful. He wrote that though it perhaps kept out some poor who sought leases, “there is no doubt
that on several occasions the necessary money has been borrowed for a few hours to enable
people to qualify.”72 Such a loophole rendered the requirement toothless and should be
abolished. In its stead, Stewart suggested, “A statement signed by two land owners to the affect
that an applicant is respectable and a fit person to take up land would doubtless answer the
purpose quite well.”73 Second, Stewart argued alongside the commission that, whatever was
decided with respect to transfers of land, “they ought to be absolutely barred to Indians or natives
in the districts suitable to European colonization.” He reasoned, “Owing to the insanitary habits
of Asiatics and Africans, they are not fit persons to take up land as neighbors of Europeans.

Ibid. The principle of commissioner’s consent for transfers of lease was linked to both racial and capital
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There are enormous tracts of land in the Protectorate perfectly suitable for Indians to develop
without encroaching on the comparatively small area suitable for European settlement.”74 Even
so, he noted that the existing small gardens and plots in the area were acceptable as they could be
“easily controlled.” Third, Stewart agreed that rate payers should be allowed to elect their own
members of the Municipal Committee by vote, but he had a problem with the suggestion of the
commission that such voting be restricted to Europeans. “As long as Indians and natives pay
taxes,” he wrote, “they ought to have a vote for their representative but the white rate payers
wish to monopolize the right of voting, and I fail to see how this could be countenanced by
Government.”75
And finally, the fourth major point of agreement with the commission, was that the staff
of the EAP government needed to be expanded. Several new posts, like a Commissioner of
Native Affairs, a Land Board constituted of official and non-official members, and an Assistant
Crown Advocate, were all argued as necessary. The Land Board in particular, Stewart argued,
would “be a boon to the country, as many points that still form the subject of discussion could be
dealt with more speedily and with greater satisfaction to the settlers than is at present the case.”76
The primary argument against such a scheme was that it would incur a larger expense. He
countered that, “By arranging for a quicker settlement there would be an introduction of fresh
capital, and therefore a rising revenue, which in a very short time would repay any extra expense
that may be incurred.”77 The same argument for the speed of settlement was made for the
Assistant Crown Advocate, along with the “moral impossibility for one officer to conduct all
prosecutions, draft ordinances and title deeds, and advise on legal questions of every nature.”78
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Stewart concluded by asking for a telegraphic reply if any of the suggested appointments were
approved.
Learning from Australasian Mistakes
Stewart’s dispatch covered so many different points of substantial importance, that W. D.
Ellis at the CO produced a long typed memorandum, alongside the usual short handwritten
minute summarizing his opinion, to adequately address all of his concerns. In the handwritten
minute, Ellis summarized the dispatch and Land Commission Report as he saw it: “Speaking
generally the Committee’s bark is worse than its bite – I mean that while . . . they appear to
advocate free transfer with a view to a land boom and land speculation like that which took place
in the early days of Australasia, their actual proposals are of a much more moderate character.”79
He therefore had a strong reaction to the idea of free transfer of land, but did not think the other
points were as radical. To counter the arguments of Stewart and Ainsworth, Ellis turned to the
historical example of free transfer in Australia and New Zealand.
Ellis’s Australasian example was fully fleshed out in his memorandum. He began by
noting that the report of the Land Commission showed “an entire ignorance of the history of
legislation on these subjects in other new countries such as Australia and New Zealand.”80 The
desire to grant the free transfer of land was a natural one, but not, Ellis posited, necessarily right.
“It was against this desire,” he continued, “that the much abused Colonial Office of the forties
and fifties of last century fought in vain.81 The land grabbers triumphed with results that are
regretted, I think, by every one in Australasia to-day, except of course the heirs of the successful
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grabbers.”82 Ellis highlighted this point by providing three examples of the failure of free
transfer to promote development. First, in New South Wales in 1891, “42 million acres had been
alienated in freehold with 22 millions of which, equivalent to about 2/3rds of the area of England
and Wales, was in the hands of 677 persons. Only 2 percent of the 42 millions and 1/10th percent
of the 22 millions were cultivated.”83 Prospective settlers to the area, seeing that the land was
held in the hands of people who did not use it, settled in urban areas leaving rural growth
stagnant. Similarly, in New Zealand in 1891, it was found that 8 ½ million acres were held by
only 337 people. And finally, Ellis used the example of Tasmania, observing “that whereas in
1860 with a population of 87,775, 153,000 acres were under crops, in 1891, with a population of
145,000 the area under crops had only increased to 157,000 acres, though more than 4 ½ millions
had been alienated from the Crown.”84 This arrested development over more than thirty years,
he remarked, showed “the cost of selling land without guarantees for satisfactory
development.”85
While these examples showed undesirable results from the CO’s perspective, Ellis
supplemented his argument with the resultant real negative conditions in Australia and New
Zealand. He summarized the problems: “It is facts like these, directly traceable to bad systems
of Crown Lands Legislation, which explain most of the worst features in Australasian life – the
slow growth of the population, the rapid growth of the towns, reproducing in the midst of vast
vacant lands the worst evils of old civilizations in the way of sweating and overcrowding, the
ever increasing debt, and the rise of a Socialist party which is led by the experience of such
abuses of the rights of property to endeavor to destroy the very institution of private
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ownership.”86 The CO of the 1840s and 1850s tried to counteract the wholesale alienation of
land by raising the auction upset price for agricultural land and granting leases of pastoral land
for only limited periods of time, but this attempt at control was overturned by the Australasian
settlers’ vociferous support for the “three F’s,” Fixed tenure, Fixed rents, and Free sales of
rights.87
Ellis drew five conclusions from this history to inform land legislation in the EAP. First,
land should be surveyed before it was offered for sale or lease. If this was not done, then the
settlers could take more land than they paid for and lead to abuses like obstruction of waterways,
roads, and railroads. Second, with the land surveyed, it should be classified and priced
accordingly. Third, strict conditions for development and cultivation of the land should be
enforced. Fourth, grants of land should not be made in freehold as a rule. Instead, settlers
should have a lease in perpetuity, or 999 years, with periodic reappraisal of rent. And finally,
restrictions should be placed on alienating land to prevent any one person from accumulating too
much land.88 With his historically informed opinion on the free transfer of land complete, Ellis
turned to the Land Commission and Stewart’s recommendations.
Ellis began by commenting on the suggested changes to the Crown Lands Ordinance of
1902 proposed by the commission and commissioner Stewart. First, he agreed with Stewart’s
recommendation that if land is reverted to the government after being unoccupied, the landholder
should receive some compensation; either half of the original amount paid or half the average
value of the land at the time of resumption. Next, Ellis disagreed with Stewart’s assessment that
there should be no compensation for improvements on land resumed by the government.
Stewart’s argument that there would be no trouble renewing leases for those who showed that
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they “had done good work” on their property,89 was insufficient. Although there might be no
difficulty in renewing a lease, the principle of compensation was admitted in previous
legislation90 and, Ellis argued, should be applied in the EAP.91 Finally, he rejected the last major
recommended change to the ordinance, that lessees could not give portions of their land to others
without the consent of the commissioner of the EAP. Where Stewart argued against it by noting
how it would be an effective tool to control the “class of men” coming into the protectorate, Ellis
argued that it would prevent the accumulation of land in the hands of a few persons, like in
Australia and New Zealand.92
Beyond the recommended changes to the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, Ellis agreed
with Stewart on the four93 general suggestions he supported alongside the Land Commission.
First, he concurred that potential settlers could so easily avoid the £300 requirement to receive a
grant that it should be replaced, as Stewart suggested, by a “certificate of fitness” signed by two
landowners. Next, the question of reserving the highlands of the EAP for only Europeans at the
expense of Africans and Indians was, Ellis mused, “one of some difficulty and delicacy.”94 He
gave a succinct account of the issue from both sides: “Indian traders were established at the coast
before any Europeans were there, Indian labour made the railway, and Indian soldiers aided in
the conquest of the country. At the same time, I think that in view of the large amount of country
which will in any case be left open to Indians and which is not suitable for European
colonization the restriction should be imposed.”95 With respect to allowing Indian rate payers to
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vote in municipal elections, Ellis differed with the positions of the Land Commission, which
wanted the vote exclusively for Europeans, and Commissioner Stewart, who wanted all rate
payers to be allowed to vote. He agreed with Stewart that Indians could not be excluded from
voting, but with the potential conflict with the settler population in mind Ellis recommended that
the matter be left alone. And finally, Ellis agreed with Stewart and the commission that the
expansion of EAP staff; especially the Land Board led by a competent Land Officer, and an
Assistant Crown Advocate to quicken the pace of settling legal issues, would ease the problems
of survey and law that plagued potential settlers.96
Ellis’s memorandum was well received by the other officials of the CO. Herbert Read
began his minute by noting that he had “very little to add to Mr. Ellis’s full and interesting
minute, with which I agree generally.”97 His primary concern was with the expansion of the
staff. “It is impossible to read this report and the evidence attached to it,” Read minuted,
“without seeing that we have a very big job before us, and if it is to be successfully carried
through we shall require very capable and experienced men . . . and must be prepared to pay such
salaries as will attract the right sort of men.”98 For Read, the three most urgent matters before
the CO were related to the expansion of the staff for better and faster surveys of land, the
acquisition of an Assistant Crown Advocate, and the appointment of a competent Commissioner
for Land. On all three issues, he recommended getting Treasury approval of an expanded budget
to acquire them. The recommended changes to the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 and general
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suggestions of the Land Commission, Read minuted, had been addressed by Stewart and Ellis
and those matters could be left to the SoSC.99
Indeed, the discussion among CO officials was dominated by the question of who should
take the position of Commissioner for Land. Reginald Antrobus agreed that they “should
certainly endeavor to profit by the experience of Australia and New Zealand” by creating a
dispatch embodying Ellis’s remarks “wording it, of course, so as not to hurt Australian feeling,”
and pursue a Commissioner for Lands with experience with settlement in either Canada or
Australia.100 Montagu Ommaney minuted that he preferred a candidate from Canada than
Australia or New Zealand, but he also proposed an English barrister as a possibility.101 The
ultimate decision lay with the SoSC. Yet by the time the discussion passed through the CO to
the SoSC in mid-December 1905, there was a new occupant of the post. A new Liberal ministry
led by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had appointed Lord Elgin to replace Alfred Lyttelton.
Lord Elgin had previously served as the Viceroy of India from 1894 to 1899, and he immediately
brought that experience to bear.102 He agreed that the appointments of new staff should be
approved, and surmised that a land officer from India with knowledge of settlement issues there
would be the best possible candidate.103 With the general land issues of the Land Commission
postponed and the staff question settled, the CO telegrammed approval of the new appointments
and expansion of staff to the EAP,104 and also sent a dispatch to the Treasury explaining the
expansion of the EAP budget.105
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Like the debate over Dr. Doering’s lease, the same three conclusions can be drawn in the
debate over the report of the Land Commission: the principles and rhetoric of autarky dominated
the debate, the rhetoric of autarky was effective, and the principles of autarky were the prime
mover of policy. With respect to the first conclusion, the principles of autarky were appealed to
at almost every point. In the debate over free transfer, for example, Stewart, Ainsworth, and
Ellis all used the principles of autarky to argue both for and against it. Stewart and Ainsworth
argued that free transfer would promote effective occupation and development as owners who
could not afford to develop a whole grant could sell off those portions they could not to others
who were capitalized to do so. Furthermore, their plan would promote financial independence as
free transfer would bring capital into the EAP in the form of speculation and taxing lands not
under crops. Ellis used the same rhetoric of autarky in his historical example of Australia and
New Zealand to argue against free transfer. Free transfer led to rampant land speculation that, in
turn, led to horrendously ineffective occupation and underdeveloped land; a fate the CO was
seeking to avoid.
Even the other topics under discussion were framed with the promotion of the goals of
effective occupation, development, and financial independence in mind. A few examples will
show the general rule. The restriction of selling portions of land without the commissioner’s
consent was rejected on the grounds that the government wanted to control the “class of men”
entering the EAP, and also to prevent land accumulating in a few hands. The racial restriction to
settlement in the White Highlands, too, was also argued via effective occupation; if European
settlement was only possible in a relatively small area, let only Europeans settle there. Similarly,
the expansion of the EAP staff to include more experienced, and therefore expensive, officers
was argued with the rhetoric of autarky. Settling land laws and disputes, and faster surveys
would promote faster settlement and therefore larger revenues at a later date leading to financial

Ferguson 60
independence. The CO even used this reasoning when asking the Treasury for an expanded
budget for staff.106
The prevalence of the principles of autarky in the discussion underlines its effectiveness.
Indeed, the only position argued without using the rhetoric of autarky, limiting the municipal
franchise to Europeans, was rejected by both Commissioner Stewart and the CO. The other
positions, all argued as ways to promote the principles of autarky, were either accepted or, in the
case of free transfer, a more effective autarkic argument was presented. To be sure, the fact that
the discussion among CO officials was limited to who specifically would take the post of land
officer is a clear sign that Ellis had argued definitively for his positions.
And finally, the discussion of the report of the Land Commission shows that the
principles of autarky were the prime movers of policy. The effectiveness and use of the
principles of autarky in the debate clearly demonstrates this. To draw on an alternative example,
Sorrenson made the argument that junior officials, like Ellis, had inordinate control over the
direction of policy.107 However, as has been shown, this is only true that Ellis influenced the CO
insofar as he argued for and promoted the principles of autarky.
This chapter, using three different, largely unrelated, discussions in the months following
the CO assumption of responsibility of the EAP, maintained three points: the principles of
rhetoric were ever-present, the rhetoric of autarky was effective, and the principles of autarky
were the prime mover of policy. However, methodological questions can be raised. Are these
points limited to the specific period under examination? The three discussions, for example, all
have the same officials present: commissioner Stewart, W. D. Ellis, Herbert Read, Montagu
Ommaney, and Alfred Lyttelton.108 Furthermore, these discussions were not followed to their
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ends.109 Do the principles and rhetoric of autarky follow a discussion at every point, from
suggestion to final implementation? Chapter four answers these questions by following the
debate surrounding the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919 within the CO.
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Chapter 4
The Language of Policy:
The East African Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919
While chapter two followed the articulation of the principles and rhetoric of autarky
during the IBEAC and FO periods of the EAP in a general sense, and chapter three followed it in
three specific discussions immediately following the transition to CO responsibility, this chapter
will fill the methodological gap by following the discussion of a policy from its proposal to its
implementation across several years and through different CO and EAP administrations. That
policy, the East African Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919, was decisive in establishing the
paramountcy of European settler interests in the EAP and what would be Kenya Colony. It put
the attention and financial resources of both the colonial government and the CO at the service of
the European settlers with little to no regard for the majority African population. With this in
mind, the Soldier Settlement Scheme has been framed in several different ways: as a defensive
measure against a potential African rising, an opportunity for restless and jobless exservicemen;1 a political move to strengthen the settler position;2 a critical event in determining
the aristocratic shape of the settler community;3 and an abandonment of policy initiative from the
CO to the colonial governor, and by proxy, the settlers.4 These reasons and frames of reference,
in and of themselves, were either thoroughly objectionable to the CO or based on unsound
premises questioned by officials within the CO. Why, then, did the CO go along with a land
program whose premises it rejected? By examining the correspondence between the colonial
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government in Nairobi and the CO in London, one can see that the principles and rhetoric of
autarky framed and directed the course of policy.
The precedent of soldier settlement began with the Romans. The practice of giving
grants of land to veterans of military campaigns was seen as a solution to several different
problems. Foremost, the state’s responsibility to its soldiers could be satisfied with grants of
land, as well as being a sweetener to encourage enlistment. This was also a way for the Roman
state to avoid giving cash payment to soldiers. Soldier settlement also conferred military and
political benefits to the state. By giving soldiers grants of land in the territory that was recently
conquered, the state rid itself of politically discontented ex-soldiers, and created a friendly
landed class that would be willing to defend their position in the event of a revolt or rebellion by
a hostile population. Finally, the damage that war caused the agricultural sector could be
avoided by having landowners invested in the development of the land.5 The colonial
government and the settler dominated War Council would use these same basic arguments for
soldier settlement, and they will form key aspects of the debate in the Kenyan case.
A Modest Proposal
In fact, it would be the War Council that would instigate the idea of soldier settlement in
the EAP. The War Council was an advisory body to the governor of the EAP that consisted of
civil officials, military officers, and unofficial settler members. The purpose of the War Council
was to assist the governor and give advice on how to better coordinate protectorate resources
with the military during the First World War. In reality, the council was an opening for the
settlers to voice their political opinions and have a say in government. Not insignificantly, it
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paved the way for elected representation of European unofficials.6 This new political power
prompted the War Council to press for what would be the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919.
The proposal for a soldier settlement scheme was first broached in a confidential dispatch
to the CO on 8 January 1916. Enclosed in this dispatch was a memorandum of the unanimous
opinion of the War Council on a potential soldier settlement scheme. The principal concern of
the council was the security of British colonists in a massive swath of land encompassing
Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, the EAP, the Uganda Protectorate, and German East Africa,
which was to come under British administration after the cessation of hostilities. The War
Council suggested that security would be best obtained by “granting to each British Volunteer or
soldier taking part in the East African campaign a block of land not exceeding 320 acres
agricultural or 1,000 acres pastoral within the area specified above.”7 As to the terms of the
grants, they recommended that the land “be granted on a 999 years lease at an initial rental of 10
cents per acre but without any capital charge or stand premium.”8
Their reason for these bold proposals rested on their fears of an African rising in the wake
of their wartime experience. African soldiers who killed Europeans would, it was argued; see
that they are not as inferior in combat as they presumed. The War Council stressed that African
troops proved themselves to be able soldiers and, in some cases, “even vastly superior to some of
the other units of the Force.” These were facts, the War Council argued, that Africans “will not
be slow to realize.” The new influx of European soldier settlers would have a pacifying effect on
the African population and help to simplify the “new conditions” of postwar East Africa. Since
the memorandum was merely a simple summary, the War Council requested that if their scheme
was not rejected outright, that a special commission be appointed to examine the details of how it
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might be implemented. They closed their memorandum with the note that “as the proposed
lessees would be drawn from many parts of the Empire a great Imperial purpose would be served
by focusing such widespread attention on the Territory concerned.”9
The governor, Sir Henry Conway Belfield, noted his general approval of the War
Council’s memorandum and the arguments employed in favor of the scheme. Belfield’s assent
to the settlers’ position was characteristic of his governorship, despite the fact that he was
appointed to curb settler advances on African land rights.10 Although he agreed on the general
principles outlined by the War Council, he tempered some of the more grandiose claims. The
immense area that the council recommended for the soldier settlement scheme, “between the
Zambezi and the Abyssinian Frontier and between the Indian Ocean and the Congo border,”11
was well outside of its authority and that of the governor. Belfield was quick to point this out to
the CO, and refused to speak to anything outside the EAP.12 Within the protectorate, however,
he agreed with the War Council that the war experience “must have impressed upon the African
native a sense of his value as fighting material when opposed to Europeans.”13 While Belfield
did not imagine that an African rising was an inevitability given these new postwar conditions,
he posited that a sizeable increase in the European settler population would help to nullify the
possibility of a revolt, and “should be encouraged on that account irrespective of the advantage
which would accrue to the country from a further flow of white immigration.”14
The last point that Belfield commented on the War Council memorandum was the
expansion of the potential grantees from those volunteers and soldiers in the East African
campaign to all servicemen. He noted that he did not know why the War Council restricted the
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scheme to those serving in East Africa.15 Such a restriction, he argued, would be a tremendous
missed opportunity to the detriment of the protectorate. Belfield proclaimed himself a firm
believer that there would be a considerable portion of soldiers that would not want to go back to
their “indoor life and to sedentary occupations” after the excitement and experience of the First
World War. These men would be inclined to go, as Belfield put it, “to those parts of our
Colonial Empire which can offer the inducements of temperate climate, outdoor occupation, and
profitable enterprise.”16 The soldier settlement scheme had the potential of drawing these
emigrants to the EAP rather than the better-known dominions, like Canada and Australia. In
closing his dispatch, Belfield recommended to the CO that the scheme be open to “all men of
British nationality” who served in the war, and that these men “are in a position to occupy and
develop the area granted and are not endeavoring to acquire it merely for purposes of speculation
and sale.”17
It is significant that the initial arguments of both the War Council and Governor Belfield
for a soldier settlement scheme prominently refer to the principles of autarky, particularly
development and effective occupation. Tellingly, the War Council’s memorandum lists the
acreage of agricultural and pastoral land grants, rental fee and lease terms before bothering to
explain the postwar security challenge that the settlement scheme was supposed to counteract!
Governor Belfield attempted to highlight the security concerns behind the scheme when he noted
that it should be encouraged on that merit alone, but he betrayed his autarkic stance when he
admitted such immigration would bring benefits to the protectorate. Even his recommendation
to expand the scheme to include all men of British nationality was couched in autarkic rhetoric.
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He argued that to do so would bring greater attention to the EAP and attract men who would
develop the land and have the capital to do so.
When the CO received the governor’s dispatch over a month later, it was met with only
practical concerns by the CO officials. W. C. Bottomley, a first-class clerk in the East Africa
Department of the CO, minuted that he agreed with Belfield that the man fighting in Europe
should be given the same consideration as the man fighting in East Africa. His primary concern,
however, was the careful interpretation of what the governor termed “profitable enterprise.” He
wrote, “Men who go to East Africa must either possess money enough to tide over some years of
unproductive labour or must be assisted.”18 T. C. Macnaghten, another first-class clerk and
eventual member on the committee of ex-soldier settlement,19 drew attention to the soldier
settlement schemes of other colonies and self-governing dominions. He posited that their efforts
would be invested in finding solutions for their problems and would not be able to do much for
the servicemen from the United Kingdom proper, “at any rate until they have arranged for their
own men.”20 Turning to the EAP itself, Macnaghten questioned whether British emigrants could
thrive permanently in the East African climate. When he noted that no one knew if a British
population could “retain its vigour after fifty or a hundred years” in such a climate, Herbert Read
opined in the margin that it was “very doubtful.”21 In a subsequent minute, Read commented on
the security question; the supposed reason for the soldier settlement scheme. He reminded the
other officials that the colonial government exercised strict control of the traffic of arms and that
within the EAP there were few firearms in the hands of Africans, except those who serve in the
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local armed forces. This control made the question of an African rising a relative non-issue.22
Like the War Council memorandum, it is significant that the issue of an African rising was only
approached after four days of discussion in the CO, while concerns of a potential influx of
settlers and their ability to thrive were immediately voiced.
The SoSC, Andrew Bonar Law, sent Belfield a response on 2 March. While he noted
that a definite decision on the soldier settlement scheme could not possibly be decided at the
moment, he agreed with the governor that if the scheme were to be implemented it could not be
restricted to soldiers who had taken part in the East African campaign. Since no decision could
be reached, Bonar Law instructed Belfield to prepare a memorandum similar to the one
recommended by the War Council. It was to set out in detail the amount of available land in the
protectorate, the amount of capital estimated to be required for the purchase and development of
a land grant. As he closed his dispatch, Bonar Law repeated that the CO had not made any
decision on the issue, “and should rumours as to land grants to those who have taken part in the
campaign gain credence in the Protectorate it would probably be well that the position in this
respect should be made clear.”23 The clarification that expectations of land grants should be
subdued was almost certainly an attempt to avoid the land grant troubles of Commissioner Sir
Charles Eliot and Governor Sir Percy Girouard.24 However, the CO may have already come to a
decision, as the original clarification on potential rumors had a line drawn through it and read
that rumors “should be officially denied.”25
The Scheme Considered
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On 16 August, Governor Belfield sent a lengthy dispatch to the CO with the report of the
committee to examine the details of soldier settlement. The committee was composed of three
prominent Protectorate officials, Barton Wright, the Land Officer and chair of the committee, A.
C. MacDonald, the Director of Agriculture, and William McGregor Ross, the Director of Public
Works. In accordance with Bonar Law’s request, the committee enclosed statements of
estimated expenditure for different land holding sizes, the potential cost of farm buildings and
diagrams of them, and cost estimates for infrastructural improvements necessary to adequately
accommodate new settlers.
Beyond the raw facts and figures they provided, the committee made several policy
recommendations based on their examination. The first recommendation was to reduce the size
of the proposed land grants. The War Council’s figures of 320-acre agricultural and 1,000-acre
pastoral grants were “unnecessarily large.”26 The Director of Agriculture advocated 160-acre
farms for mixed and specialized farming and 240-acre plots for ordinary mixed farming. He
justified the change in grant size by comparing the costs of developing the different sizes with
their expected returns. The Director of Public Works, McGregor Ross, disagreed with the size of
the minimum grant and posited that grants as small as 40 acres could be made viable. He argued
that this was possible in areas that required limited development outlay, particularly with regard
to available water and proximity to existing infrastructure. This was not the only point on which
McGregor Ross disagreed with the rest of the committee, as we shall see.27
The second recommendation of the committee was a substantial capital requirement.
While the need for private capital had been addressed previously in general terms, the committee
put the figure concretely at £700. The requirement assumed, first, that the grantee would provide
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for his own buildings and would not receive government aid. It also took into account the
estimated period of time until the farm could be self-sustaining, and left a margin for “unforeseen
contingencies” like building maintenance. McGregor Ross opposed the capital requirement
figure on the grounds that housing alone would cost £600 in favorable conditions over the first
seven years.28
Yet McGregor Ross’s greatest departure from the committee was on the purchase of land
for soldier settlement. The committee introduced the idea of the colonial government purchasing
suitable land for soldier settlers from existing settlers who owned undeveloped land and African
and other reserves. The committee’s argument was that purchasing such land conferred benefits
to the prospective settler in the form of neighbors that could give advice and help with starting
up a new farm, and preexisting infrastructure. Another argument was that the spread of
infrastructure and support in these existing settler areas would allow for the subdivision of land
that was previously slated by the government as useful only for pastoral purposes into smaller
mixed farming plots. This would increase the effective development and value of the land.
Although the committee acknowledged that this plan would add yet another cost to the
settlement scheme, they wanted to stress its potential advantages.29
McGregor Ross created an entire appendix to the committee’s report to give voice to his
objection. He first protested the idea of buying undeveloped land from settlers. By doing so, the
colonial government would be complicit in the land speculation that it abhorred, beyond the
massive £450,000 cost. Ross proposed that the government levy a tax of one shilling an acre on
undeveloped land. This would furnish, he estimated, £100,000 of revenue and promote
development of land previously untouched. The revenue would go a long way to help allay the
costs of infrastructural improvements to accommodate the new soldier settlers. The proposed
28
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reduction of African reserves was objected to on the lines of the cost and the lack of evidence
that the reserves were “excessive for the requirements of the native population.”30
One point on which McGregor Ross agreed with the rest of the committee was the
proposition that the land be developed. The committee stated their objective clearly, “A further
point which the Committee wish to bring forward is that provision should be made to secure the
end sought for by Government, namely, to settle men on the land, and not to make presents of
areas which can be immediately sold or transferred.”31 To this purpose, the committee suggested
that personal occupation of the land granted be a requirement, and that the lease be withheld until
the grantee fulfilled the development and occupation requirements. To further prevent the
possibility of land speculation, the grantee would not be allowed to transfer land until the lease
was awarded. Additionally, the committee put a premium on the personal quality of the potential
grantees. To ensure the proper quality was attained for the scheme, they recommended two
selection boards be established to screen candidates, one in England and one in the EAP.32
The War Council reviewed the report by the committee and their opinions were included
in the dispatch to the CO as a separate memorandum. They attacked all of McGregor Ross’s
positions in as direct a manner as permissible. The controversial issue of purchasing land in the
reserves was tactfully sidestepped. Seeing the issue as too controversial, the War Council
requested that it be tabled so as to not “complicate and delay the issue.” Therefore, the sections
of the report considering the issue should not be considered, including Ross’s opposition
appendix. The War Council continued, “in any case this Appendix raises a question which in the
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opinion of the War Council has no bearing on a close settlement scheme but is a matter of
general policy.”33 It then took Ross’s building estimates in its sights. They posited that the
Director of Agriculture’s estimates were “adequate” and that Ross’s appendix on farm buildings
and cost “should be ignored.”34
McGregor Ross was no friend to the European settlers, especially the War Council.35
This fact sheds light on not only the hostile reception of his views by the council, but also his
disagreement to several of the points suggested by the committee. These disagreements are
clearly oppositional to the scheme itself and the settlers generally, rather than simple
developmental and cost concerns. His suggestion that the minimum grant be set at 40 acres
would curb the large-scale alienation of land to Europeans. The estimate that building costs
alone would be near £600 had the potential to scuttle the scheme because of unreasonable capital
requirements. His objection to buying land from African reserves was the first example of
official concern for Africans with reference to the scheme beyond the fear of a potential rising.
It is significant that Ross couched his positions in autarkic terms. Although governor Belfield
would make no mention of his dissenting opinions to the CO, it plainly shows the importance
placed on the principles of autarky in official decision-making within the protectorate.
The governor’s commentary on the committee’s report and the War Council’s
memorandum was centered on two concerns: the capital requirement and the inaccessibility of
the land to be granted. As to the former, Belfield stated that he was “bound to come to the
conclusion that, unless financial assistance is provided, the success of any close settlement
scheme must necessarily presuppose the possession by the settlers of a small capital.”36
However, he also entertained the suggestion of the War Council “that a limited number of farms
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should be earmarked for alienation to potential settlers who are not possessed of the requisite
capital but who may nevertheless desire to take up small holdings after two or three years
residence in the country.”37 This plan would expand the European population immediately after
the war and provide the supposed security that was the original reason for the scheme. The
governor’s latter concern of land inaccessibility was divided into road and railway estimates. He
placed the road estimate at £334,000, but wrote, with a tinge of uncertainty, “that a
comparatively small expenditure of say £50,000 would probably suffice in the first instance.”38
Railroads were a greater concern to Belfield than roads. He wrote, “Until therefore Government
is able to embark on the expenditure necessary for the construction of railways it is not possible
to say that a close settlement scheme would be a complete success.”39
When the CO received the dispatch, F. G. A. Butler, the private secretary to Bonar Law,40
took ten days to compose a thorough minute. After outlining the contents of the dispatch, he
concluded that the EAP government could not afford the massive costs entailed in a large
settlement scheme, and that “any experiment that is tried must clearly be on a much less
ambitious scale.”41 This smaller scale necessitated, according to Butler, the limitation of
potential applicants to those men “who have actually served in the East African campaign.”
While he did not feel justified in making a general decision at the moment, he proclaimed, “we
must do something for the double purpose of shewing some appreciation of the services of the
white men who have fought for us in the arduous East African campaign, and of endeavoring to
increase the white population of the Protectorate in face of the overwhelming native
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population.”42 With rationalizations for the scheme, Butler went on to list potential guidelines
for another commission of inquiry in the EAP, and sent his minute on for review.43
Macnaghten voiced the same doubts he had in February about the viability of a
permanent British settler population. He argued that if “expert medical opinion” advised that a
British population could not thrive in East Africa, then “any scheme for facilitating the
settlement of the ordinary British soldier in British East Africa would in my opinion be purely
harmful.”44 Beyond mere health concerns, Macnaghten drew on the famous imperial writer H.
Rider Haggard’s commentary on South Africa. Macnaghten wrote, “Sir H. Rider Haggard said
of South Africa that the conditions there ‘rule out the Union at any rate at present as a place
where the British ex-working man or ex-private soldier should seek a home save in exceptional
cases’ but commended the country for half-pay and retired officers and persons with capital at
command. Do not these views apply with even greater force to British East Africa?”45 In the
margin alongside a narrative he wrote of the potential hardship of the “poor ex-soldier,” an
official wrote, “the position of a well-to-do settler or a retired ex-officer is quite different.”46
Herbert Read agreed with Butler that a “big scheme was out of the question,” but he had
several other concerns.47 His first apprehension was that a commission composed of official and
unofficial representatives might raise expectations “which we may be unable to satisfy.” He
pointed to the possibility of the protectorate not being self-supporting, or, if it was, not able to
foot the massive bill to improve infrastructure. Second, Read objected to Butler’s reasons for
pursuing the scheme. He suggested that soldiers engaged in “not less arduous campaigns in
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other parts of the world” should not be excluded. As to the prospect of an African uprising, Read
noted that there would still be a large military presence in East Africa at the end of hostilities and
that, barring the Northern Frontier District, the Africans had no firearms and were “unwarlike.”
He concluded his minute by asking if it might not be better to delay the scheme until the end of
the war.48 Sir George Fiddes, the permanent undersecretary of state, agreed with Read’s
suggestion to delay, and reminded the other officials that the shortage of labor “had already
become acute” before the war.49
Almost two weeks later, Arthur Steel-Maitland, the undersecretary of state for the
colonies,50 minuted that he agreed with Butler’s suggestion for a commission in the EAP to
consider the details of a potential scheme. In agreeing with Butler, Steel-Maitland disagreed
with Read that such a commission would raise expectations. “They are raised already,” he
stated.51 The CO, he argued, would be in a “very false” position if they denied the governor’s
suggestion for a local commission. However, he did agree with Read on one point, “To hold the
matter over to the end of the war is wise in many cases but peculiarly unassailable in this, as the
end of the war is just the location to meet which steps should be taken if at all.”52 On 3
November, Bonar Law sent a response to Belfield consenting to his formation of a commission
with official and unofficial members. He told Belfield that the body that would be the Land
Settlement Commission, should be restricted in considering a capital requirement for applicants,
and that the CO would not provide funding for either individual settlers or infrastructure.53 Just
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as Read proposed, Bonar Law’s dispatch marked the cessation of serious consideration of the
soldier settlement scheme until the end of the First World War.54
The correspondence of 1916 set the stage for the establishment of the Soldier Settlement
Scheme of 1919, and the decisive arguments considered by both officials in the CO and the EAP
were linked to the principles and rhetoric of autarky. McGregor Ross, the voice of opposition to
the scheme in the protectorate, carefully framed his arguments in terms of effective occupation,
development, and financial independence. In his separate appendix, Ross protested that the
proposed plan to buy undeveloped land from settlers would make the government complicit in
land speculation and cost a staggering £450,000. These two points clearly show an undermining
of effective occupation and financial independence. Within the CO, Macnaghten argued against
a large and general plan by raising the question of whether the common European could thrive in
the East African climate. He noted that it could only work if the “well-to-do settler” or “retired
ex-officer” settled in the country, not the “poor ex-soldier.” These arguments were countered or
nullified by the committee’s commitment to developing and settling the land by recommending
personal occupation, capital requirements, and selection boards.55 However, the debate over the
scheme would be tabled until after the end of fighting in the First World War.
At the very end of 1918, discussion of the soldier settlement scheme resumed with a
telegram from acting governor Sir C. C. Bowring56 that outlined the recommendations of the
Land Settlement Commission that was created in 1916. There were several departures from the
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original committee recommendations. The commission advocated a capital requirement of £500,
much less than the original estimate, and, perhaps more importantly, the addition of 83,000 acres
from Kikuyu reserves and 53,000 acres from forest reserves for small farms. However, Bowring
admitted his hesitancy as to the practicability of taking this land at the present moment. The
commission agreed with the original committee that an occupation requirement would be
imposed for six months before title was issued. It also followed the CO’s original instructions
and set limited funding for infrastructure and none for direct assistance to individual settlers.
The last major point that the commission stressed was that “the present labour supply is not
organized to cope with any large and immediate influx of settlers.”57
The CO’s response was a telegram on 13 February 1919 asking for the new governor, Sir
Edward Northey’s, considered opinion with regard to the commission’s report.58 Governor
Northey, a supporter of European settlers,59 would engage in what Robert Maxon terms
“government by telegraph;” the deliberate use of telegraph messaging to keep policy initiative
out of the CO’s hands.60 He showed this tendency immediately with his rapid and short
telegrams to the CO. On 17 February he told the CO that while the report was ready, it was
effectively useless without the supporting evidence, which was not.61
Debate, Decision-making, and Telegrams
Five days later, on 22 February, Northey wired a summary of his views to the CO. While
he noted that he had only just received the Land Settlement Commission’s report and could not
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give his “final opinion” yet, he repeated some of the recommendations that had been outlined by
Bowring. Northey drew particular attention to the personal quality of the potential applicant, and
the unavailability of African labor. He ended the telegram with the assumption, “Feel sure that
you wish me go ahead with details without reference to you. Meanwhile am willing receive
applications posted me here from ex-soldiers for registration.”62 This assumption was all the
more bold as he admitted that he did not have the time to “formulate definite proposals.” Lord
Milner, the new SoSC, quickly responded to Northey with a few points. The product of a
meeting with Macnaghten and Leopold Amery, the new undersecretary to Milner, this telegram
proposed to issue a public notice of the scheme with specific reference to the £500 capital
requirement, the African labor shortage, the nature of the farms, and the experience the colonial
government expected of potential applicants. Beyond this, Milner stressed his reluctance to
Northey’s speed and autonomy, “Like you I am anxious to make progress but consider that
definite principles should be agreed upon. Please state what principles you have in mind.”63
On 8 March, the “Indian Question,” a contemporaneous debate about the position of
Indians64 within the EAP, figured itself into the soldier settlement scheme. A delegation of
Indians met with Amery at the CO at the end of February to discuss the potential inclusion of
Indian soldiers who served in East Africa in the settlement scheme. They proposed to Amery,
“For the scheme to be a success it would be necessary to make it clear that it was one for the
settlement of Indian farmers of a good class, for their own benefit and as a reward for their
services to the Empire, and not for the provision of Indian labour for European planters.”65
Northey telegraphed his opinion clearly to the CO. He stated, “I consider that any land available
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for settlement in this Protectorate other than that required for British European soldiers should be
given to Somalis, Arabs and other African natives of this Protectorate who have served the King
loyally in this war.” However, this was merely a gesture. He continued with his real policy
vision, “Moreover I am satisfied that all the available land will and should come under
cultivation in due course under European supervision with greater advantage to the Protectorate
itself and to the local natives than by the importation from another portion of the Empire of
immigrants of another race.”66
The response within the CO to Northey’s telegram was mixed. Bottomley first noted that
Northey had indeed said “a great deal” in a short telegram. His recommendations were framed
by his view that the goal of the colonial government should be “the development of the African,
so that he can in the future take a proper share of his own country.”67 Bottomley stressed his fear
of potentially restricting African development by actively importing Indian immigrants, and
pointed to the service of the Carrier Corps and King’s African Rifles as just as worthy of reward
with land. Northey’s position on European settlement was just as susceptible to Bottomley’s
development objection. He minuted, “The weak point is the difficulty of getting the land back
from the Europeans, so that the native can have it for himself when he is capable of making full
use of it.”68
Amery’s answer to Bottomley was direct, “Africa for the Africans is a policy which can
hardly come into consideration for East Africa in any case. We are committed to a policy of
white settlement in the highlands; there is already a considerable Indian community, mainly
traders; the Arabs and Somalis, whom the Governor would favor, are also Asiatics or at any rate
just as alien to the natives as the Indians.”69 He went on to rationalize this position in autarkic
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terms, “The real question in a relatively thinly peopled and new country like East Africa is how
to secure the maximum development for the resources of the territory for the benefit of all its
inhabitants present and prospective, including any immigrants who can do well there and
contribute to the general prosperity.”70 Even with this strong pronouncement, Amery was
guardedly open to the idea of the settlement of a “really good type of Indian agriculturalist.”
However, these questions were seen as a matter of general policy that did not concern only the
EAP, “and one on which the general policy must come from this office and not from the local
Governors.”71 While Milner advised waiting to hear from the Indian government before making
a policy decision,72 the principle of European soldier settlement was certain.
The Indian Question brought up the topic of African welfare in relation to the soldier
settlement scheme for the first time in the CO. Although McGregor Ross had indirectly
defended it, African welfare had not formed as the subject of a debate among CO officials. It is
important to see that when it did arise, it was consumed by concerns for effective occupation and
development. British ideological concepts of empire, like the trusteeship of African interests
espoused by Bottomley, were either thrust aside or ignored.
Yet there was little time to dwell on these heavy policy pronouncements. On 14 March,
Northey finally sent the telegram the CO originally requested. He disagreed with the report on
several different points and proposed changes. His first major deviation was the capital
requirement. Where the commission recommended £500, Northey recommended £1,000. This
massive increase prompted him to propose dividing the potential applicants into two different
classes, Class A applicants would have less than £1,000 and take up wage labor in the
protectorate while developing their holding, and Class B applicants would have the required
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capital and pay a premium for the farm “at a fair valuation.”73 With his suggestions sent, he
finished by telling the CO that he was ready to start selecting local candidates.
Bottomley, as the head of the East Africa Department, was again the first official within
the CO to comment on Northey’s telegram. His first concern was that the premium price that
Northey recommended would “materially reduce the attractiveness of the scheme.” Second, he
worried that the governor was rushing the application process. As Northey had recommended
allotment of land to take place in person in the EAP and he wanted to start these allotments in
July, Bottomley recalled the difficulty of transporting applicants to the EAP and advised telling
the governor to limit the initial allotments to 500,000 acres in an attempt to give applicants from
abroad an equal chance as those already within the protectorate.74 Macnaghten agreed with
Northey that there should be a purchase price as that was the standard used in similar schemes
elsewhere.75 Amery was in agreement with both officials and proposed a compromise where the
purchase price would be accepted, but fixed “substantially below the value.”76 Milner was in
agreement and wired Northey instructions to set the price low and limit initial allotment to
500,000 acres.77
Yet Northey sent another telegram to the CO before receiving Milner’s instructions. His
first of several new recommendations was that “three members with East African experience” be
appointed to the selection board in London. Northey recommended Sir Northrup McMillan,
Captain Ewart Grogan,78 and P.H. Clarke, all of whom were, conveniently, already on their way
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to England. Second, he told the CO that he was prepared to allot up to 800 farms to Class B
applicants on the 1 July allotment. Although he had not yet received word from Milner, he
justified his haste by arguing that any delay might cause these Class B applicants, the men with
significant capital, to look to other parts of the empire for opportunities for investment. He also
presented a representative scheme that would allow applicants in England to hire representatives
within the EAP to select the farms that they want. This eliminated the need for applicants in
England to be in the protectorate in person and the delay of allotment. Finally, Northey laid out
his timetable; applications for the first allotment would stop by 14 June, the names of applicants
approved by the selection boards would be drawn by lottery for 1 July allotment, a one month
grace period for grantees to exchange titles for contiguous farms, and finally the titles would be
published on 1 August. He closed his telegram by telling the CO that he had drawn up
conditions of payment, development, and residence for the grantees, but would send them after
he had received approval of the “scheme as outlined.”79
“The Lottery Part of the Affair”
Upon receipt of Northey’s telegram, the CO was consumed by questions surrounding the
proposed lottery system. Bottomley immediately expressed clear concern, “The lottery
arrangements are obscure to me.”80 He noted that if applicants were already selected by the
board and have chosen their farms, there would be no need for the exchange period for
contiguous farms as they would already be so. However, if the lottery were implemented along
the lines of two drawings, one for an applicant and one for a random farm, “a particular applicant
may find himself with a farm quite unsuitable to his particular purpose and 200 miles away from
that of his friends with whom he wished to work.” In this case, the exchange of titles would be
absolutely necessary. He stated that he did not object to the lottery in principle, and that while he
79
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preferred to have those approved by the board be guaranteed a farm, it might be helpful in the
possible situation of more applicants than farms, at which point the selection would favor those
who applied first.81 Macnaghten was entirely against the idea of a lottery, and agreeing with
Bottomley’s preference for selection “in all cases.” To avoid the problem of too many
applicants, he proposed the selection of applicants “by installments of so many hundreds at a
time.”82 Fiddes surmised that in the case of applicants outnumbering farms there were only two
systems that would avoid discontent, “lottery or ‘first come, first served.’” Like Bottomley and
Macnaghten, he preferred the latter, but it would be unfair to those soldiers who would be
demobilized at a later date.83 With no clear answer, the CO merely requested that Northey send
details of the lottery proposal.84
Characteristic of his “government by telegram,” Northey’s fast responses caused an
overlap in communication, normally avoided in dispatch writing. His 6 April telegram was a
long, in-depth response to Milner’s request for details of the soldier settlement scheme.85
Interestingly, whether by design or by chance, several points of the telegram were garbled and
rendered unintelligible. Even so, several important aspects of the scheme were laid out as well
as smaller details, such as the location of the selection board in Nairobi. Perhaps most
importantly, Northey simplified the size classifications of land grants into two classes, Class A
farms of less than 160 acres and Class B farms of more than 160 acres. These new classes would
correspond to the class A and B capital requirements of potential applicants. Since the Class A
applicant would have less than the required £1,000, Northey proposed that they not be subjected
to the initial purchase price that Class B, with the requisite capital, would be. He agreed with
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Milner’s recommendation that only 500,000 acres be allotted in the first instance, and to that end
he told the CO that he was prepared to allot 250 class A farms and 800 class B. Only applicants
of “purely European extraction engaged in active service” were to be considered, as well as
nurses. Personal occupancy and development requirements were established along the lines of
the CO. The lottery was mentioned as a part of the allotment process, but no details were
included.86
The sole comment on the telegram came from Bottomley and expressed both extreme
pressure and confusion. He first noted that the governor’s telegram was the basis for a press
announcement and official statement from the CO as to the soldier settlement scheme. These
public statements were desperately needed as the CO was besieged by requests for information
on the scheme. Beyond the corruptions from transmission, Bottomley stressed that the telegram
was “difficult to understand.” He was “as much in the dark about the lottery part of the affair as
ever,” and it was a matter of serious importance that the CO be able to tell potential applicants
where they stood to receive land as early as possible.87
Bottomley highlighted the latter point with two examples. The first example was a man
who had served in the EAP for twelve years and resigned on account of his deafness and
prospects for promotion. He had war service and was eligible for the scheme, but was eating
into his capital waiting for the scheme to be implemented and demanded to know whether he
would definitely be allotted land or not. The man reminded Bottomley that the colonial
government was definitely allotting land to certain schemes, and pointed to the disabled officers
colony.88 When told that it was a special circumstance for disabled officers, he said he “was
(through his deafness) quite as much disabled in the public service as anybody who had lost a leg
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in the war.” The other example was of “an officer of an excellent type who has to find
employment in order to keep himself going before he can have a farm allotted to him.” When
asked if he could seek employment and still be considered for the scheme, Bottomley replied in
the affirmative. Bottomley told the CO that these cases illustrated “the sort of questions which
we will have to answer by the hundred when the scheme is announced.”89 He closed his minute
with the note that the draft telegram was proposed under “extreme pressure” and wished that it
“be got off at once.”90 His request was heeded and with no further comments by the other
officials at the CO, Milner sent a telegram asking Northey for clarification of the lottery and the
corrupted portions of the telegram.91
On 14 April, governor Northey finally sent his clarification of the lottery alongside the
final detailed plan of the soldier settlement scheme. The plan was of almost no account to the
officials of the CO; they gave minor marginal changes almost exclusively in the character of
wording and grammar. The principles of the scheme, which remained unchanged from the
previous telegram, had already been agreed to. Northey’s explanation of the lottery was the final
missing piece to the CO’s vision of the overall scheme. He explained that the names of
applicants selected by the selection boards in Nairobi and London would be drawn against
numbers denoting the order in which they could choose their plot of land. The applicants would
then be able to select the plot that he desires that has not been allotted to those before him or her
in the order of selection. If there were to be more plots than applicants, the lottery would merely
determine order of selection. However, if there were more applicants than plots of land, those
applicants that drew blanks during the lottery would be excluded.92
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The CO gave little in the way of opinions on the scheme as laid out by Northey.
Bottomley summarized his thoughts on the scheme as it stood: “If we are not to give anyone a
definite promise of land this arrangement is as good as can be devised.”93 With no other opinion,
he asked that the drafts of the official statement and press announcement be examined by the
other officials before publication.94 George Grindle, the assistant undersecretary of state for the
colonies,95 was only concerned with the practical considerations facing the CO. He
recommended the hiring of a special staff to “deal with the applications which will pour in as
soon as the press notice appears.”96 With no serious concerns from other officials, Milner
merely wired Northey the presumption that those applicants that drew blanks in the lottery would
be placed in the second allotment.97
Although governor Northey’s “government by telegram” led to confusion and appeared
to be rushed, the CO never lost control nor were they challenged in any meaningful way in
establishing how the soldier settlement scheme would take shape in the EAP. The confusion
surrounding the lottery and circumstances of individual cases were cleared up by Northey in a
satisfactory way so as to not merit continued discussion by officials. When the CO voiced major
developmental, financial, and occupation concerns, such as the lowering of the premium price or
limiting the initial allotment to 500,000 acres, Northey adopted the recommendations without
protest. Indeed, even the speed with which Northey pushed the program appeared to be in line
with Bottomley’s anxiety to let potential applicants know where they stood to receive land as
soon as possible. While the general principles were agreed to with little problem, execution
would be a different matter.
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Problems of execution arose quickly. The requirement that applicants selecting farms for
allotment had to be in the EAP, either personally or by representative, created complications that
the CO sought to address. Moreover, these problems necessitated information that the CO had
hitherto not considered. Milner sent a telegram to Northey on 1 May with suggestions and
requests for information. He first noted that the reproduction of maps and catalogues in London
for selection of land grants would leave “no chance of completion of statement of choice by June
14,” the deadline of the first allotment. Milner therefore suggested that the deadline for London
applicants be postponed for a month. Additionally, he requested to know the number of Class A
and B farms assigned for London applicants and how many altogether.98
Northey quickly sent a response telegram three days later. In response to Milner’s
request to postpone the deadline for selection in London, he told the CO that he anticipated that
“the majority of London applicants will prefer to make choice of farms through agents here with
extensive local experience.” Even so, Northey expected to have the catalogues and maps
necessary for selection in London sent in time to allow a full month before the deadline without
postponement. He stressed the latter point by stating that any delay of allotment would cause the
“greatest dissatisfaction here as date has been definitely advertised and many applicants have
been waiting months in this country,” presumably spending their development capital on
maintaining themselves in the protectorate. To Milner’s question about the number of Class A
and B farms allotted, Northey had 260 and 1,080 total farms respectively, but he did not
discriminate between farms assigned to London applicants and local applicants. He closed his
telegram to the CO with a stern message: “I trust that Your Lordship will instruct Home
Selection Board to hustle. I am hustling here to get things done and not to further postpone
matters but if Your Lordship decides that allotments for home applicants must be postponed then
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please authorise me to allot up to the 500,000 acres to local applicants on the dates already
advertised.”99
Northey’s telegram was received with increasing anxiety and discomfort at the CO.
Charles Jeffries, a second-class clerk and member of the Home Selection Board,100 made these
feelings quite clear by stating that the governor’s telegram showed that he “under-estimated our
difficulties.” The time by which the maps and catalogues would reach London would not give
the CO enough time, only four days. Jeffries insisted, “We must clearly have the month’s grace
which we have asked for.” Given this need, he saw no reason that Northey could not allot the
initial 500,000 acres as long as the interests of London applicants were protected against
applicants in the protectorate taking all the best land. While Northey insisted that London
applicants would not need maps and catalogues if they were aided by representatives, Jeffries
maintained, “even those who know nothing of the country will want to know how they stand and
what farms are available.” Clearly frustrated, he could not help but note, “some hint of the
difficulties caused by the premature publication of the scheme in E.A. seems called for also.”101
George Grindle repeated Bottomley’s fears, “We cannot afford to be rushed into a fiasco over a
business of such importance, and must insist on being given time to organize it properly. As it is
I am very much afraid the allotment will go wrong.”102 In his response telegram, Milner told
Northey that the CO required the month’s grace requested earlier. In order to prevent discontent
in the protectorate, Milner allowed Northey to allot the 500,000 acres locally before London
applicants provided that those acres be drawn by lot from the whole area to be alienated to
protect London applicant interests.103
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Despite governor Northey’s admonition that the Home Selection Board act quickly, it
was still reviewing the conditions of the scheme at a preliminary meeting on 12 May. The
meeting, consisting of three prominent settlers, the previous governor Henry Conway Belfield,
and Bottomley, felt the rush of time as acutely as the CO. Lord Cranworth, one of the settlers on
the selection board, and Belfield both considered that there would not be enough time to
complete the selection process by the proposed date. They suggested an additional two months,
but did not press the issue. However, the most important suggestion again came from Lord
Cranworth. He proposed that the London lottery be a simple ballot that would draw names of
applicants against the catalogue of farms.104
The CO jumped on Lord Cranworth’s suggestion of a lottery by ballot. Jeffries, in an
exceptionally long minute, laid out the strengths and weaknesses of such a plan. He began with
the obvious problem that the plan would give the applicants no choice in selecting their farms,
except for the period of exchange after initial allotment. However, he posited that the majority
of applicants under the current system would not get much choice either. Since most of the
London applicants would be relying on the same representatives in the EAP for farm selection,
most applicants would select the same plots and the first to choose would get all the best land
with the remainder having no choice. This would lead to reshuffling just like in Cranworth’s
lottery plan. Jeffries put it simply, “if the principle of Lord Cranworth’s suggestion be accepted,
a considerable amount of expense could be saved.”105 Bottomley concurred and noted the
approval of the whole selection board for the plan.106 Milner quickly asked Northey if the new
lottery plan was acceptable.107
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The CO’s problems were not lessened on the receipt of Northey’s next telegram in reply
to Milner’s request for the number of Class A and B farms assigned for local and London
applicants. He told the CO that he assigned 200 Class A farms for local applicants, but only 53
for those in London. His argument was direct; it was better to “accommodate the poor men now
in East Africa Protectorate before importing more.”108 In the CO, Charles Jeffries was quick to
point out that the governor was right to reserve 200 farms locally. However, he envisioned
public discontent among London applicants for Class A farms. With a large number of
applicants expected and only 53 farms to allot, almost all of the applicants would be rejected out
of hand. Jeffries drew the conclusion that it would be better to limit allotment of Class A farms
to the Nairobi selection board. This would save the London board time, effort, and the ire of
rejected applicants.109 Bottomley and Grindle both agreed without any serious concerns.110
Execution Despite Everything
Even so, the CO had trouble establishing the particulars of executing the soldier
settlement scheme. Much of this trouble lay with Northey and his desire to allot farms by 14
June at all cost and without regard for the CO’s difficulties in launching their selection board in
London. Indeed, Charles Jeffries was right to place the blame for this rush on Northey’s
premature publication of the scheme in the EAP and raising expectations. Yet, the only serious
disagreement with Northey from the CO was his handling of the affair; issues of general
principle were accepted out of hand as they conformed to the promotion of the principles of
autarky. In truth, the level of cooperation between the colonial government and the CO was
remarkable considering the difficulties of Northey’s style of communication and official
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frustration with it.111 The CO voiced their need for more time to screen applicants to the
governor in terms of their desire to see the scheme succeed and place applicants of means in the
EAP. This latter point was best illustrated in the CO’s lack of concern at being allotted only 53
Class A farms so as to address the poor settlers already there.
While the soldier settlement scheme would go on to be a bugbear for both the CO and the
colonial government, its establishment clearly showed the supremacy of using the rhetoric and
principles of autarky in affecting colonial policy, especially in the face of policies and actions
that the CO found objectionable. When it was first discussed in 1916, issues of security and
African welfare were superseded by policy arguments expressed by the principles of autarky.
Opponents of the scheme, like McGregor Ross and T. C. Macnaghten, couched their objections
in ways to show that it would either not succeed in its autarkic aims or impede them. This is
critical as it showed that despite the fact security and particularly African welfare were of grave
importance to the CO, they were not effective in themselves to sway officials in the CO or the
EAP.
The power of the rhetoric of autarky goes even further. These principles also proved to
be an effective screen to racist and controversial policies, like the exclusion of Indian and
African soldiers from the scheme, which would otherwise open the CO to political and
humanitarian criticism. Such criticisms were anathema to the CO, and while it could be argued
that Amery, the voice of these policies, could set policy by virtue of his position of authority, it
does not account for the fact that there was no criticism or advice to the contrary from the
permanent officials of the CO after he appealed to the principles of autarky. Even the
longstanding institutional practice of dispatch writing was thrust aside, much to the displeasure
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of the CO, when the impact of delay on attracting effective occupants to the EAP was argued.
Truly, the rhetoric of autarky was the language of policy.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: An Adaptive Model
This study has shown that the principles and rhetoric of autarky were the decisive factors
in decision-making in early colonial Kenya in a variety of ways. Chapter two followed the
earliest British administration of the EAP by the IBEAC and the FO. By examining the transfer
of responsibility from the IBEAC to the FO, the Parliamentary debate over funding the Uganda
Railway, and articulation of settlement policy by the FO, the prevalence of the principles of
autarky in determining policy was established. Chapter three showed, through the close study of
three different policy discussions after the EAP’s transfer of responsibility from the FO to the
CO and using the transfer as a historiographical focal point, that the principles of autarky were
the “prime mover” of policy rather than the traditional explanations of the personalities of
individual officials, institutional practices, and precedent. And finally, chapter four charted the
course of the soldier settlement scheme of 1919 from its proposal to implementation to argue that
the principles and rhetoric of autarky formed the “language of policy” that determined how the
scheme would come into existence; even if it contained elements the CO found objectionable.
Each of these chapters used a different approach to the primary and secondary sources to
illustrate how this model is not limited to a particular methodological approach. However, some
historiographical and philosophical questions about the nature of the principles and rhetoric of
autarky remain. With the evidence for the model well documented, it is time to answer these
questions.
Ideology? Or Something More?
David Armitage defines ideology in two senses, “first, in the programmatic sense of a
systematic model of how society functions and second, as a world-view which is perceived as
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contestable by those who do not share it.”1 In both of these senses, the principles of autarky can
be understood as an ideology. They assume, in the first instance, a systematic model of how
society functions and seek to employ policies that best satisfy that assumption. In the second
instance, the principles of autarky, particularly the principle of effective occupation, can be
contested by others.2 Ideology, and therefore the principles of autarky,3 are classified as an
object that is aspired to and contested.
However, like Cowen and Shenton’s grappling with the definition of “development” as
both process and object,4 the principles of autarky should likewise be viewed as both. Uniquely,
the principles of autarky are a process that lead to themselves. While this appears to be a
paradox on the surface, the interconnected nature of the principles clearly shows how this is the
case. Effective occupation leads to development in the form of private capital and tax revenue
for financial independence. Development brings in effective occupants and also allows for an
increase in trade, both of which lead to revenues for financial independence. And financial
independence allows the government to develop the territory and attract effective occupants.5
Each of the principles of autarky, therefore, are a process leading to the other.
The character of the principles of autarky as both object and recursive process shows that
they can be defined as both ideology and something more. As process, the principles of autarky
have the ability to effectively coopt other ideologies to achieve its ends.6 The ideological
concept of difference noted by Thomas Metcalf, for example, allowed for an ordering of people
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based on so-called scientific principles and observations.7 Such an ideology of difference
allowed the British to justify placing European effective occupants on the land over locals that,
because they were different culturally, socially, and economically, would prove, officials argued,
to be ineffective occupants. This point was effectively argued in the first chapter in the guise of
the idea of European settlement as claimed by commissioner Sir Charles Eliot. However, the
examination of the nature of the principles of autarky as ideology raises another important
question, the question of race.
The Role of Race
Race, although of paramount importance in the African context, has not been a central
theme in this study. Indeed, the only mentions of race were incidental.8 This speaks to the
incidental nature of race as related to the principles of autarky. In other words, the principles of
autarky do not inherently deal with race, and if they do, it is only contextual to the situation. To
use the capital requirements of the soldier settlement scheme as an example, the primary
motivation was to bring in effective occupants with capital. To that end, both poor whites and
Indians and Africans were largely excluded from the scheme.
However, this simple example is open to several potential objections on the basis of race.
First, some poor whites were figured into the soldier settlement scheme in the form of the
smaller “Class A” farms with little to no capital requirement. If even poor Europeans without
capital were allotted farms in the scheme, it follows that race, and not the capital requirement,
was the decisive factor in who was allowed into the scheme. Second, building on the previous
conclusion, the capital requirement could be an administrative smokescreen for racial rejection

Thomas Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 45-47, 114-115.
Metcalf’s example of the rebellion of the Oudh peasantry in support of the taluqdari system and the reinstatement of
that system is a sterling example of this point.
8 The exclusion of Africans and Indians from the White Highlands, as well as from the soldier settlement scheme,
are examples of race as an incidental theme.
7
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from the scheme. Third, the stated original reason for the scheme was to bring in more
Europeans to prevent a possible uprising of Africans. And finally, the racial principle of
exclusive European settlement in the White Highlands had been established prior to the proposal
of the scheme.
These objections have to ignore the principles and rhetoric of autarky in the official
correspondence, and do not hold up under scrutiny. While there were the Class A farms set aside
for poor Europeans in the scheme, this class of farm was continually reduced in size and objected
to by many officials, except in the case of governor Northey’s argument that they could help the
poor Europeans already in the EAP. Next, if the capital requirement was a simple smokescreen
to allow for a racist policy, there would not be the level of contention and debate over many
years and administrations surrounding such a requirement and its particulars. Additionally, the
third chapter demonstrated how the original reason to bring in Europeans was in fact a
smokescreen for advancing the principles of autarky! And the final objection was addressed in
the first chapter, advancing the principles of autarky was the deciding factor, but it was informed
by racist concepts, particularly by individuals like commissioner Sir Charles Eliot. These
refutations support the critical distinction raised at the beginning of this section: the principles of
autarky do not inherently deal with concepts of race but can be informed by them. With the
principles and rhetoric of autarky avoiding simple definition as an ideology or manifestation of
concepts of race, a final point remains: the principles of autarky can be applied to historical
contexts beyond early colonial Kenya.
Moving Forward
This study had an acute focus on early colonial Kenyan decision-making, but the
principles of autarky can be applied to a variety of other historical contexts. Within this study,
the relevance to other areas has been made clear. The rough genealogy of the principles of
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autarky in the introduction illustrates that it can be applied to political and administrative thought
anywhere from Classical Greece to the British Raj. Even the officials in this study knew its
broad relevance in other colonial contexts, such as T.C. Macnaghten and W.D. Ellis giving
historical examples of South Africa and Australasia respectively to reinforce their arguments.
Yet the chief argument in favor of the broad applicability of the principles of autarky
comes from its nature as an adaptive paradigm. Put simply, the answer to the questions ‘what is
effective occupation,’ ‘what is development,’ ‘what is financial independence,’ will change from
context to context. For example, the answer to the first question changed across all three
chapters, but it did not change the intensity of its effect.9 This adaptability has many
historiographical applications beyond the new perspective on colonial Kenyan history. To use a
specific example to illustrate the point, the French concepts of the mission civilisatrice and mise
en valeur were the way in which French imperial ideology annunciated its pursuit of the
principles of autarky.10 And finally, the model provides insights for administrative history in
general: how powerful, unspoken conceptual forces, like the rhetoric of autarky, shape and
control administrative policy discussions.

In other words, what qualified someone as an ‘effective occupant’ changed continuously in the form of capital
requirements, development requirements on the leased property, personal occupation, etc. However, these changes
did not alter the impact of the principle of effective occupation.
10 See Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 4-7. Interestingly, Conklin’s introductory explanation of French
imperial ideology as either “mastery” or “freedom from tyranny,” both primarily in a physical sense, mirrors the
central concept of autarky. What is a better way to live “mastery” or “freedom from tyranny,” than to be selfsufficient?
9
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